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INTRODUCTION 
Across the country, tens of thousands of children who have 
suffered a level of abuse and neglect requiring removal from the family 
home are being forced to pay for their own foster care.! As a part of 
revenue maximization strategies often developed through contracts with 
private companies such as MAXIMUS, Inc.,2 foster care agencies are 
! An amicus brief filed on behalf of thirty-nine states explains how "[t]he amici States-
indeed, to our knowledge, all States" act as representative payees for foster children's Social 
Security benefits in order to apply the children's benefits to reimburse state costs, and estimates 
that "at any given time, state agencies serve as representative payees for tens of thousands of 
foster children." Brief for State of Florida et at. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at I, 4, 
Wash. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371 
(2003). 
2 MAXIMUS is one of the largest private companies providing revenue maximization 
services to state and local governments. See Press Release, New Jersey Awards MAXIMUS 
Revenue Maximization Contract, May 31, 2002, http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml? 
c=88279&p=irol-newsArticle&t=Regular&id=30 1531. 
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engaged in the systemic practice of converting foster children's Social 
Security benefits into a source of state funds. The agencies identify 
foster children who are disabled or have deceased or disabled parents, 
apply for Social Security benefits on the children's behalf, and then take 
the children's benefits to reimburse foster care costs for which the 
children have no legal obligation.3 The states are using the Social 
Security benefits as a funding stream in order to reduce state 
expenditures rather than as a resource to address the children's unmet 
needs in the severely broken foster care system.4 Furthermore, the 
benefits are not being conserved to aid the children in their forthcoming 
and difficult transitions from foster care to independence.5 
MAXIMUS promotes its "SSI Project" with the Illinois 
Department of Children and Family Services as an example of how the 
company can help state agencies benefit from the practice of using 
foster children's Social Security benefits to reduce state costS.6 The 
bottom line: as a result of MAXIMUS' s efforts to help the state identify 
4300 disabled foster children and use the children as a conduit to 
convert their Social Security benefits into a state funding source, "the 
3 Brief for State of Florida et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note I, at 1-6. 
The Supreme Court also explains the State of Washington's process and notes that foster children 
have no liability to pay for the costs of their care. Kejfeler, 537 U.S. at 377-79, 382. However, at 
least one state has passed legislation requiring the use of foster children's available resources to 
reimburse state costs. See MINN. STAT. § 260C.33 I (b)-(c) (2005). 
4 See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, What Does a Fair Society Owe to Children-And Their 
Parents?, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 1941, 1956 (2004) (noting the "dismal state of foster care"); 
Martin Guggenheim, Somebody's Children: Sustaining the Family's Place in Child Welfare 
Policy, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1716, 1716 (2000) (reviewing Elizabeth Bartholet's Nobody's 
Children: Abuse and Neglect, Foster Drift, and the Adoption Alternative, and stating that 
"[v]irtually everyone familiar with current child welfare practice in the United States agrees that 
it is in crisis"). For a specific state example, see OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AUDITS, MARYLAND 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY, AUDIT REPORT, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, SOCIAL SERVICES 
ADMINISTRATION (March 2005), available at http://www.ola.state.md.us/reportfiles/fiscal/ 
HumanResources/SSA05.pdf (legislative audit finding that foster children are not receiving 
critically needed seIVices: 35% of foster children not in school, 40% of the children not receiving 
dental seIVices, and over 30% of the children not receiving required monthly visits by their 
caseworkers). 
5 See, e.g., Austen L. Parrish, Avoiding the Mistakes of Terrell R.: The UndOing of the 
California Tort Claims Act and the Move to Absolute Governmental Immunity in Foster Care 
Placement and Supervision, 15 STAN. L. & POL'y REv. 267,278 (2004) (describing the results of 
a University of Wisconsin study finding that "after leaving foster care, 27% of males were 
incarcerated within twelve to eighteen months, 50% were unemployed, 37% did not graduate 
from high school, 33% were on public assistance, 47% were receiving counseling or medication 
for medical problems just before leaving the system, and 33% were diagnosed with three or more 
psychiatric problems"); Casey Family Programs, Improving Family Foster Care: Findings from 
the Northwest Foster Care Alumni Study (March 2005), http://www.casey.org/Resources/ 
PublicationslNorthwestAlumniStudy.htm (access full study through link on right side of page) 
(finding that former foster children are twice as likely to suffer from post-traumatic stress 
disorder as Iraq war veterans). 
6 MAXIMUS, Inc., Eligibility Determination SeIVices, http://www.maximus.com!corporate/ 
pages/eligibilitydetermination.asp (last visited Jan. 20, 2006). 
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state has realized savings of more than $12 million since the project's 
inception."7 MAXIMUS takes a cut of up to 12.5% in such revenue 
maximization projects.8 
There is no federal statute, regulation, or policy that specifically 
addresses this use of federal benefits. The practice is not the result of 
deliberative policy discussions regarding how to best serve children in 
foster care; it is simply an ad-hoc reaction by under-funded state 
agencies. 
Foster care agencies screen children in state care to determine 
those who are currently or potentially eligible to receive Social Security 
benefits because of the children's disabilities or because the children's 
parents are deceased or disabled.9 The agencies then apply for benefits 
on the children's behalf and seek to become the children's 
representative payees in order to manage the benefit payments.1O 
Although state agencies are the least preferred choice for a 
representative payee ll and the Social Security Administration is 
required to look for anyone more preferred,12 the state agencies are 
selected as the payees for foster children through a virtually automatic 
process l3-with the applications processed in batches through a 
computer programming tool termed the "kiddie loop. "14 
Once the agencies become representative payees, their new roles 
provide access to the children's funds through a fiduciary relationship. 
However, rather than fulfilling their fiduciary obligation to consider and 
choose between various uses of the benefits to best serve the interests of 
7 Id 
8 This calculation is based on a range of contingency fees MAXIM US has charged in 
revenue maximization contracts in other states. See Nebraska Health & Human Servs. System v. 
HHS Regional Director for Region X, Department of Health & Human Services Departmental 
Appeals Board, DABI660 (1998), available at hrtp:llwww.hhs.gov/dab/ decisions/dabl660.htrnl 
(noting revenue maximization contract with MAXIMUS under a contingency fee of 12.5%); 
KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, DIVISION OF PURCHASES, CONTRACT RENEWAL 
02571, Feb. 5,2003, http://da.state.ks.us/purch! contracts/ContractDatal0257l.doc (MAXMIMUS 
revenue maximization contract with 6.5% contingency fee); Maryland Revenue Maximization 
Contract, Baseline and Contingent Fee Provisions, Section IV(C) (MAXMIMUS revenue 
maximization contract with 8.5% contingency fee) (on file with author). 
9 The process is described in the brief filed by the Washington State Department of Social 
and Health Services in Keffeler. Brieffor Petitioners at 9-10, Wash. State Dep't of Soc. & Health 
Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371 (2003). 
to Id 
II 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.202 I (c), 416.621(c) (2005). 
12 Keffeler, 537 U.S. at 376 n.l. 
13 See infra notes 200-207 and accompanying text for a discussion of the automatic process 
of selecting state agencies as representative payees for foster children. 
14 UNITED STATES SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL 
SYSTEM (POMS) § GS 00502.110 (B)(3), available at http://policy.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/ 
Inxl020050211 0 [hereinafter POMS]. The POMS is the "publicly available operating 
instructions" used by Social Security Administration staff. Keffeler, 537 U.S. at 385. The 
Supreme Court explains that "[w]hile these administrative interpretations are not products of 
formal rulemaking, they nevertheless warrant respect .... " Id 
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the children, the agencies apply fixed state rules that require using the 
children's Social Security benefits to reimburse state costS.15 Consider 
the story of a fifteen-year-old boy in foster care named John, 
a story of uncommon cruelty, compounded by layer upon layer of 
bureaucratic incompetence. And finally, no remorse from the only 
parent the boy, at age 15, has left-the Department of Social 
Services. . .. In a case that illustrates the daunting odds that face 
teens aging out of foster care, the story began when the boy was a 
baby and his father, soon after adopting him, died of cancer. In his 
will, [the] church custodian ... left young John a savings account, a 
monthly survivor benefit and a Habitat for Humanity house with a 
small monthly mortgage [of $221 per month]. But the boy was also 
left with a stepmother who subjected him to daily abuse for his first 
seven years-whippings with belt buckles and Venetian blinds, the 
judge recounted. To the doctor at UNC who noted broken bones and 
cigarette bums on the child, John had confided that the stepmother 
"would become mean when she smoked the rock." Enter an aunt, 
who next adopted John and moved into the little house ... , What 
social workers didn't know-for another six years-was that the 
aunt enlisted the child to sell drugs for her. . .. With the boy now 
left in foster care and the custody of the DSS, what at last forced the 
case into public view was that Habitat was about to foreclose on the 
vacant house, having received no payments in a year. The DSS, it 
turned out, was using the child's survivor benefit to reimburse itself 
for his support. Though the child's lawyer's pleaded that protecting 
the child's inheritance was "the fair and decent thing to do," an 
attorney for DSS argued that the agency had no obligation to use the 
boy's money to pay his mortgage. "What ifhe had a $2,000 monthly 
mortgage? What if every kid (in foster care) wanted a car?" argued 
[the] DSS attorney .... "It would be wonderful if all this court had 
to do was what's 'fair and decent. "'16 
If John's representative payee, now the local department of social 
services, applied fiduciary discretion to determine how to use the 
benefits to best meet John's needs, the payments could be used to make 
the small mortgage payments on the Habitat for Humanity home so that 
John not only has a place to live when he ages out of foster care, but a 
home that is truly his.17 Also, the excess benefits beyond the mortgage 
payments could be conserved as part of a plan to help John prepare for 
15 See infra note 189 and accompanying text. 
16 Lorraine Ahearn, At Eleventh Hour, Judge Saves Boy in Foreclosure, GREENSBORO NEWS 
& RECORD, Dec. 18, 2005, available at http://www.news-record.com/apps/pbcs.dll/ 
artic1e?AlD=/2005l2l8INEWSRECOlO1l512180313/201001INEWSREC0201. 
17 The trial court in this case ordered that the Guilford County Department of Social Services 
must use the Social Security benefits to pay the back payments and monthly mortgage payments 
on John's home, and the agency has since appealed and has sought a stay of the order. Petition of 
Guilford County Dep't of Soc. Servo for Writ of Supersedeas and Motion for Temporary Stay at 
4, In re J.G., No. P05-ll70 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005). 
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his transition to independence. 18 Several options are possible. The 
benefits could be used to save for college or pay the cost of vocational 
education and training and to purchase specialized tools or equipment 
for John's future chosen profession. The benefits could also be saved to 
purchase a car-now virtually a necessity for independent living. Or, 
the benefits could simply be conserved in a savings account that can 
serve as an emergency fund for the many unforeseen expenses that John 
will likely encounter. 
However, under current state agency practices, John's individual 
needs and circumstances are not considered. Apparently adhering to a 
blanket agency rule,19 the state agency automatically applies John's 
benefits to reimburse the state for costs that John is not legally obligated 
to pay.20 
Although the practice strips foster children like John of a crucially 
needed resource and ignores the children's individualized needs, a 
unanimous Supreme Court upheld the practice in Washington State 
Department of Social and Health Services v. Guardianship Estate of 
Keffeler, 2 I relying on supporting amicus briefs filed by most states, 
numerous counties, the U.S. Solicitor General, and several national 
child advocacy organizations.22 Luckily for Danny Keffeler, by the 
time of the Supreme Court's decision in his case, his grandmother had 
successfully held off the state's attempt to replace her as representative 
payee, and Danny's benefits were conserved to allow him to obtain a 
college degree.23 Unluckily for the tens of thousands of other foster 
children receiving Social Security benefits, their state agency 
representative payees-now armed with the Keffeler decision-will 
18 See bifra notes 140-144 and accompanying text. 
19 In North Carolina, the state policy manual directs local offices and staff that 
[tJhe county DSS must be aware of all resources available to a child, which may 
include a child's unearned income from sources such as Supplemental Security 
Income, Social Security Survivor's benefits, trust funds, endowments, or child support 
paid directly to the agency. When a child is IV-E eligible, the agency must use the 
child's resources as part of the cost of care .... 
North Carolina Dep't of Health and Human Services, Division of Social Services Manual, 
Chapter IV: 1203 Foster Care Funding § IV(q http://info.dhhs.state.nc.us/olmlmanuals/dss/csm-
20/ manlCSs 1203-09 .htm. 
20 See supra note 3. 
21 Wash. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 
371,375,392(2003). 
22 See Brief for Children's Defense Fund et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
KefJeler, 537 U.S. 371 (No. 01-1420), 2002 WL 1808594; Brief for Juvenile Law Center & the 
National Center on Youth Law as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, KefJeler, 537 U.S. 371 
(No. 01-1420), 2002 WL 31399628; Brief for State of Florida et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, supra note I; Brief for Counties of the State of California et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, KefJeler, 537 U.S. 371 (No. 01-1420), 2002 WL 1822201; Brief for the 
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, KefJeler, 537 U.S. 371 (No. 01-1420), 
2002 WL 1836735. 
23 See infra notes 73-84 and accompanying text. 
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continue to use the children's benefits to replenish the state coffers 
rather than to meet the children's needs. 
However, the Court's holding in Keffeler was limited, concluding 
that the state's use of children's Social Security benefits does not violate 
the anti-attachment provision of the Social Security Act.24 Several 
possible statutory and constitutional challenges survived the decision. 
Despite the importance of this issue to the well-being of children in 
foster care, the use of children's Social Security benefits by state foster 
care agencies has received little attention from legal scholars.25 This 
Article seeks to shed light on the practice-to explain why using the 
children's benefits to reduce state costs rather than on the children's 
needs is bad policy and subject to legal challenge, and to provide 
suggestions for reform. Part I describes the framework of children's 
Social Security benefits, explains how the children's benefits are used 
as a part of revenue maximization strategies, and reviews the Supreme 
Court's decision in Keffeler. Part II examines the policy concerns 
implicated by the practice, including the tension between the specialized 
needs of individual foster children and the fiscal interests of the state 
agencies. Part III analyzes possible statutory and constitutional 
challenges to the practice that were not addressed by the Supreme 
Court. In Part IV, the Article concludes with suggestions for 
developing reasoned policies and practices that would pay better 
attention to foster children's individual rights and needs. 
I. THE FRAMEWORK: CHILDREN'S SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS, 
REVENUE MAxIMIZA nON, AND KEFFELER 
Children can be eligible for two types of Social Security benefits: 
Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) under Title II of 
the Social Security Act,26 and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 
24 KefJeler, 537 U.S. at 382-88. The anti-attachment provision of the Social Security Act 
protects social security benefits from "execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal 
process." 42 U.S.c. § 407(a) (2000). 
25 No legal scholarship has addressed the use of foster children's Social Security benefits 
since the Supreme Court upheld the practice in KefJeler. Two articles were written about the 
issue prior to the Supreme Court's decision. See Jim Moye, Get Your Hands Out of Their 
Pockets: The Case Against State Seizure of Foster Children's Social Security Benefits, 10 GEO. 1. 
ON POVERTY L. & POL'y 67 (2003); Tobias J. Kammer, Note, KefJeler v. Department of Social 
and Health Services: How the Supreme Court of Washington Mistook Caring for Children as 
Robbing Them Blind, 77 WASH. L. REv. 877 (2002); see also Patrick Gardner, KefJeler v. DSHS: 
Picking the Pockets of America's Neediest Children, YOUTH LAW NEWS, July-Sept. 2002, at I, 
available at http://www.youthlaw.orglYLN.3.2002.pdf; Bruce Boyer & Martha Mathews, Should 
Agencies Apply for and Receive SSIon Behalf of Foster Children?, YOUTH LAW NEWS, Nov.-
Dec. 1999. 
26 42 U.S.c. §§ 401-434 (2000). 
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under Title XVJ.27 The purpose of providing OASDI benefits to a child 
is to replace lost financial support due to a parent's disability or death.28 
OASDI is an insurance program: a child's eligibility to receive the 
benefits is not based on income or assets but is contingent upon 
sufficient parent contributions through payroll taxes.29 SSI is a needs-
based program that provides benefits to low-income disabled 
individuals.30 Unlike OASDI, a child's receipt of SSI does not require 
that the parents paid into the system through payroll taxes, although 
eligibility is limited under specified income and asset thresholds.3l The 
Supreme Court has described the purpose of children's SSI as providing 
a "'minimum level of income' to children who do not 'have sufficient 
income and resources to maintain a standard of living at the established 
Federal minimum income level. "'32 
Social Security benefits for a child, both SSI and OASDI, must be 
paid to a representative payee.33 A representative payee has a fiduciary 
relationship to the child beneficiary,34 including an obligation to manage 
and expend the benefits "only for the use and benefit of the beneficiary" 
in a manner that the payee detennines "to be in the best interests of the 
beneficiary."35 To guide the exercise of this discretion, the Social 
27 Id. §§ 1381-1383f. 
28 Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 507 (1976); Laurence C. Nolan, Critiquing Society's 
Response to the Needs of Posthumously Conceived Children, 82 OR. L. REV. 1067, 1100 (2003). 
29 Peter V. Lee et aI., Engendering Social Security Disability Determinations: The Path of a 
Woman Claimant, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1477, 1482 (1994). 
30 Id. at 1483; SSI: Purpose of Program, 20 C.F.R. § 416.110 (2005). 
31 Income and SSI Eligibility, 20 C.F.R. § 416.1100 (2005); SSI: Limitation on Resources, 20 
C.F.R. § 416.1205 (2005). 
32 Wash. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 
371, 390 (2003) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.110). However, legislative history provides support for 
a broader purpose of child SSI benefits to serve the special needs of disabled and impoverished 
children with a goal of promoting their successful transition to economic independence as adults. 
H.R. Rep. No. 92-231, at 5133-34 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4989, 5133 ("It is your 
committee's belief that disabled children who live in low-income households are certainly among 
the most disadvantaged of all Americans and that they are deserving of special assistance in order 
to help them become self-supporting members of our society."); Frank S. Bloch, Three Steps and 
You're Out: The Misuse of the Sequential Evaluation Process in Child SSI Disability 
Determinations, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 39,48-51 (2003) (discussing history and purposes of 
child SSI benefits); Gardner, supra note 25, at I. 
33 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.2010, 416.610 (2005). See generally Margaret G. Farrell, Administrative 
Paternalism: Social Security's Representative Payment Program and Two Models of Justice, 14 
CARDOZO L. REv. 283 (1992) (providing a thorough explanation and critique of the 
representative payee program). 
34 Melissa Reiner Greener, Note, The Social Security Administration's Representative Payee 
Program: An Act of Benevolence or Cruelty?, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 2025, 2036 (1991); see also 
Riddick v. D'Elia, 626 F.2d 1084, 1088 (2d Cir. 1980) (representative payee has a "legally 
enforceable fiduciary obligation"); POMS, supra note 14, § GN 00502.113, available at 
http://policy.ssa.gov/ poms.nsfllnxl020050211 3 !opendocument (last visited Feb. 15, 2006) 
(providing direction for SSA staff that "[i]f the payee tells you that he/she will not carry out his 
fiduciary responsibilities without compensation, deny the application and seek another payee."). 
35 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.2035(a), 416.635(a) (2005). 
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Security Administration explains that "[ w]e will consider that payments 
we certify to a representative payee have been used for the use and 
benefit of the beneficiary if they are used for the beneficiary's current 
maintenance. "36 Current maintenance is then defined to include costs 
"incurred in obtaining food, shelter, clothing, medical care, and personal 
comfort items."37 If the benefits are not needed for the beneficiaries 
"current maintenance or reasonably foreseeable needs," the payee is 
directed that the benefits "shall be conserved or invested on behalf of 
the beneficiary."38 Regarding debt obligations, a representative payee 
"may not be required to use benefit payments to satisfy a debt of the 
beneficiary" that accrued prior to the period of benefit payments, and 
the payee is only allowed to satisfy a debt if the "current and reasonably 
foreseeable needs of the beneficiary are met" and it is in the 
beneficiary's interest to do SO.39 Children generally have no debt 
obligation resulting from their foster care.40 
A. Funding Foster Care with Children's Social Security Benefits: 
Converting an Individual Entitlement into a Public Funding Stream 
Within this framework of regulations designed to ensure Social 
Security benefits are used for the benefit of the beneficiaries, state foster 
care agencies side-step their fiduciary responsibilities and engage in a 
practice that converts the children's benefits into a funding stream for 
the state. Although children generally owe no debt as a result of their 
placement in foster care and the state agencies could not reach the 
children's Social Security benefits through legal enforcement actions 
were there a debt obligation,41 the agencies have developed a "work-
around." The process is described by the Washington State Department 
of Social and Health Services in Keffeler: "When children enter foster 
care, the Department checks to see whether they are eligible for OASDI 
36 [d. §§ 404.2040(a}, 416.640(a}. 
37 [d. 
38 [d. § 416.645 (regarding SSI benefits). Similarly, a regulation governing use of OASDI 
benefits directs representative payees that after the benefits have been used for current support 
and maintenance and other "miscellaneous needs," the remaining benefits must be conserved or 
invested on behalf of the beneficiary. [d. § 404.2045. 
39 [d. §§ 404.2040(d}, 416.640(d}. 
40 See Wash. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 
U.S. 371,382 (2003) (In concluding the state agency is not a creditor of foster care children, the 
Court notes that "[n]o law provides that they are liable to repay the department for the costs of 
their care."). However, at least one state has passed legislation requiring the use of foster 
children's available resources to reimburse state costs. See MINN. STAT. § 260C.331(b}-(c} 
(2005). 
41 KefJeler, 537 U.S. at 389 (noting that the state "could not directly compel the beneficiary or 
any other representative payee to pay Social Security benefits over to the State"). 
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benefits and evaluates children to determine whether they have 
significant physical or mental impairments that would qualify them for 
SSI benefits."42 The agency "applies for benefits if it concludes that a 
child may be eligible," and "[ w ]hen the Social Security 
Administration ... approves benefits for one of these children, it 
usually appoints the Department representative payee."43 When the 
agency receives the OASDI or SSI benefits on behalf of the children, "it 
deposits them in a special Foster Care Trust Fund Account in the State 
Treasurer's Office."44 Then, "[e]very month the Department generates 
a report of how much it has paid to the foster care provider for each 
child," the agency "compares this amount to the amount in the child's 
individual benefit account," and "[i]f the amount in the trust fund 
account is equal to or less than the entire cost of foster care, then trust 
fund proceeds are used to reimburse the Department. "45 
Although the practice described in Keffeler results in a funding 
stream that amounts to only one percent of the total federal funding for 
state child welfare programs,46 states have a strong incentive to seek out 
the children's Social Security benefits. The benefits are fully federally 
funded and enable states to replace state funds used to support foster 
children with federal funds, thereby saving state resources for other 
purposes.47 For the affected foster children, millions48 of dollars in 
much-needed benefits are being taken each year that otherwise could be 
used to meet the children's current unmet needs49 or could be conserved 
for the children's future needs during their struggle to transition out of 
foster care into adulthood. 50 
42 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 9, at 9-10. 
43 Jd at 10. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 12. 
46 CYNTHIA ANDREWS SCARCELLA ET AL., THE URBAN INSTITUTE, THE COST OF 
PROTECTING VULNERABLE CHILDREN IV: How CHILD WELFARE FUNDING FARED DURING THE 
RECESSION 14 fig. 4 (2004), http://www.urban.orglUploadedPDF/411115_Vulnerable 
ChildrenIV.pdf. 
47 Id. at 28. 
48 Id. Thirty states provided data regarding SSI funds received in 2002, which totaled $72 
million, and nineteen states provided separate data regarding OASDI benefits received, totaling 
$24 million. Id. 
49 See supra note 4; see also Sarah Ramsey, Fixing Foster Care or Reducing Child Poverty: 
The Pew Commission Recommendations and the Transracial Adoption Debate, 66 MONT. L. 
REv. 21, 21 (2005) (explaining that "in spite of major efforts at reform, the foster care system and 
the child welfare system generally are systems in crisis"). 
50 See Gail Chang Bohr, For the Well-Being of Minnesota's Foster Children: What Federal 
Legislation Requires, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 897, 907 (2005) (discussing the need to provide 
assistance to foster children transitioning out of foster care). 
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B. Revenue Maximization 
The practice of foster care agencies using children's Social 
Security benefits to reimburse state costs is a part of broader state 
strategies to increase outside funding sources in order to reduce state 
spending on social service programs.51 States are increasingly turning 
to "revenue maximization" strategies, including the use of private 
consultants, in order to maximize the use of federal and other non-state 
sources of funds. 52 In Montana, for example, legislation was passed 
requiring an agency-wide "refinancing" of programs serving children 
with the mandate to "seek federal funds to offset general fund 
expenditures to the maximum extent possible."53 The Iowa Department 
of Human Resources established a "Foster Care Recovery Unit"54 and 
devoted a chapter of its employee manual to "recovery of foster care 
costs from financial resources that are available to a child who is placed 
in any type of foster care."55 In Maryland, the foster care agency's 
strategic plan outlines a strategy to maximize federal foster care (IV-E) 
funds (federal funds used to reimburse state foster care costS)56 and SSI 
funds, including making assistance available for local agency staff to 
increase the identification and claiming of children's Social Security 
benefits.57 
1. Foster Care Cost Recovery: Parents vs. Children 
In addition to the revenue maximization strategy of recovering 
foster care costs by taking children's Social Security benefits, states also 
seek reimbursement from the biological parents by establishing child 
support obligations with payments assigned to the state rather than 
being owed to the children. 58 However, a comparison of these two cost-
51 ADAM CARASSO & ROSEANNA BESS, URBAN INSTITUTE, THE DISPOSITION OF FEDERAL 
DOLLARS IN FLORIDA'S SOCIAL SERVICES: INFORMING A FEDERAL FUNDING MAXIMIZATION 
STRATEGY 32-34 (June 2003), http://www.urban.orglUploadedPDF/410822jederal_dollars.pdf. 
52 Id. 
53 MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-1-610 (2005); see also MONTANA DEP'T OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERVS., REFINANCING, http://www.dphhs.state.mt.us/about_ us/legislative _information! 
program _finance. pdf (last visited Jan. 9,2003). 
54 IOWA DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS., FOSTER CARE RECOVERY UNIT, 
http://www.dhs.state.ia.us/fostercarerecovery (last visited Feb. 15,2003). 
55 Iowa Dep't of Human Services, Foster Care Recovery Employees' Manual 1, (Jan. 28, 
1996), available at http://www.dhs.state.ia.us/policyanalysislPolicyManuaIPageslManual_ 
DocumentslMasterIl8-g.pdf. 
56 See infra note 146 and accompanying text. 
57 SOc. SERVS. ADMIN., MARYLAND DEP'T OF HUMAN RESOURCES, STRATEGIC PLANNING 
FOR THE FUTURE (January 2000), http://www.dhr.state.md.us/ssa/strplan.htm. 
58 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(17) (2000). 
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recovery strategies illustrates how states initially set their sights on the 
children, and leave the parents who committed the abuse and neglect as 
a back-up for the reimbursement,59 
Of the total amount of foster care costs state agencies recover, the 
vast amount comes from taking children's Social Security benefits 
rather than from enforcing the parents' child support obligations. For 
example, the foster care agency in Washington State has recovered 
approximately $7 million in foster care costs per year by becoming the 
representative payee for foster children's Social Security benefits.60 
From the parents, the state has only recovered approximately $790,000 
in foster care costs per year by enforcing child support obligations.61 
Thus, Washington State is enforcing approximately ninety percent of its 
foster care cost recovery collections against the children, compared to 
only ten percent against the parents.62 
2. Using MAXIMUS to Maximize Revenue 
States are increasingly turning to private companies for assistance 
with their revenue maximization strategies.63 MAXIMUS, Inc. 
advertises that its "Revenue Maximization Division" has "identified and 
secured $1.5 billion in additional federal funding for our state clients," 
and that the company has conducted revenue maximization projects in 
twenty-five states.64 MAXIMUS charges a contingency fee for its 
59 For example, Minnesota legislation explains that children are required to use all their 
resources to pay for the cost of care first, and then the parents are required to contribute if the 
children's resources are insufficient. MINN. STAT. § 260C.33 I (b)-(c) (2005). 
60 Press Release, Wash. State Dep't of Soc. and Health Servs., DSHS Gets Temporary OK to 
Collect Benefits on Behalf of Foster Children (Jan. 29, 2002). 
61 OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FY 
2002 ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT tbl. 8 (Distributed Foster Care Collections for Five Fiscal 
Years) (Nov. 2003), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pubsI2003/reports/ 
annual statistical report/table 8.html. 
62 This comp;rison is pro~ded to illustrate how states are targeting foster children as a source 
of revenue, not to argue for increased enforcement of state-owed child support obligations against 
the parents. Establishing state-owed child support obligations against low-income parents while 
their children are in foster care can reduce the possibility of a successful reunification. See Karen 
Gievers, Listening to Silenced Voices: Examining Potential Liability of State and Private 
Agencies for Child Support Enforcement Violations, 25 NOVA L. REV. 693, 717-18 (2001) 
(noting this concern); Eve A. Stotland, Resolving the Tension Between Child Support 
Enforcement and Family Reunification, 35 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 317 (Sept.-Oct. 2001) (same). 
63 Thirty-four states were using private contingency-fee consultants to implement revenue 
maximization strategies for Medicaid reimbursements in 2004-up from ten states using the 
private consultants for this purpose in 2002. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE (GAO), MEDICAID FINANCING: STATES' USE OF CONTINGENCy-FEE CONSULTANTS TO 
MAXIMIZE FEDERAL REIMBURSEMENTS HIGHLIGHTS NEED FOR IMPROVED FEDERAL 
OVERSIGHT, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON FINANCE 4 (2005), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/ new.items/d05748.pdf. 
64 MAXIMUS, Inc., Revenue Maximization Services, http://www.maximus.com!corporate/ 
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services, converting millions in children's Social Security benefits and 
other federal funds into company profits.65 
The use of private revenue maximization consultants under 
contingency fee arrangements is appealing to states because it has the 
perceived potential to increase state funds with few financial risks. 
Under contingency fee arrangements, no up front payments are required 
and the private consultants are only paid if they increase federal 
revenues to the states.66 However, there are significant concerns. 
Several states that have used private consultants under contingency fee 
arrangements have been audited and forced to repay millions in 
improper claims.67 Further, the incentives created through contingency 
fee revenue maximization strategies can conflict with the interests of 
individuals served by state agencies and the purpose of the federal 
benefits being sought.68 In Mississippi, a legislative committee report 
concluded that the state's revenue maximization contract with a private 
consulting firm may cause the state foster care agency to have a greater 
financial interest in removing children from their homes if the children 
are eligible for federal funds, and that some children may not receive 
needed services if they do not qualify for the federal programs that are 
the subject of the revenue maximization strategies.69 
Senator Charles Grassley, Chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee 
on Finance, expressed similar reservations regarding private contracts to 
maximize state revenue from Medicaid. In a letter sent to the Secretary 
of the Department of Health and Human Services in early 2004, Senator 
Grassley noted concerns regarding contingency fee arrangements 
including fraudulent billing practices and the diversion of Medicaid 
funds to purposes other than intended: "I am extremely disconcerted 
that Medicaid monies intended to benefit low-income Americans, 
pregnant women and poor children, may instead be lining the coffers of 
consulting firms. "70 
pages/revenuesvs.asp (last visited Feb. 15,2006). 
65 Through the contingency fee structure, MAXIMUS typically makes between $3 to $5 
million from each revenue maximization contract. William Welsh, Maximus Wins Revenue 
Renewal in Kansas, WASHINGTON TECHNOLOGY, Jan. 29, 2002, 
http://www.washingtontechnology.comlnews/ 1_lIstatel17748-I.html. 
66 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 63, at 8. 
67 JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND EXPENDITURE 
REVIEW (PEER), REpORT TO MISSISSIPPI LEGISLATURE #413, THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN 
SERVICES' USE OF REVENUE MAXIMIZATION CONTRACTS 18 (Dec. 6, 2000), available at 
http://www.peer.state.ms.us/reports/rpt413.pdf [hereinafter PEER, Report to Mississippi 
Legislature #413]. 
68 See Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized Welfare, 89 CAL. 
L. REV. 569, 592 (2001) (noting that in the welfare context, private contractors receiving fees 
based upon services provided often have financial incentives inconsistent with the needs of the 
individuals they have contracted to serve). 
69 PEER, Report to Mississippi Legislature #413, supra note 67, at 18. 
70 Press Release, Senator Chuck Grassley, Grassley Seeks Answers on States' Use of 
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While similar congressional concern has not yet been expressed 
regarding the state agency practice of taking foster children's Social 
Security benefits, often with the assistance of private consultants, some 
advocates have begun challenging the practice through litigation.11 One 
case, Washington State Department of Social and Health Services v. 
Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 72 reached the Supreme Court. 
C. Danny Keffeler 
In 1990, Danny Keffeler's mother died while he was in foster care 
provided by the Washington State Department of Social and Health 
Services (DSHS).13 Danny's grandmother, Wanda Pierce, was 
appointed guardian of Danny's estate, and when Danny began receiving 
OASDI benefits as a result of his mother's death, his grandmother was 
appointed representative payee.14 Ms. Pierce expended some of the 
benefits to pay for Danny's needs that were not being met by the foster 
care program, and conserved the remainder to pay for Danny's future 
college expenses.15 Over Ms. Pierce's objection, DSHS filed a 
successful application to replace the grandmother as Danny's 
representative payee so the agency could use Danny's OASDI benefits 
to reimburse state costs.16 Ms. Pierce appealed the agency 
determination and was reinstated as Danny's payee after the 
Administrative Law Judge determined Ms. Pierce was justifiably 
concerned that DSHS was reimbursing itself with Danny's benefits 
rather than conserving the benefits for his future needs.77 
DSHS did not accept the result and in 1994 initiated a two-pronged 
legal strategy to again obtain access to Danny's Social Security 
benefits.18 The agency filed a creditor's claim in state court against 
Danny's guardianship estate, while contemporaneously continuing its 
administrative action with the Social Security Administration to replace 
Danny's grandmother as representative payee.19 DSHS dismissed its 
creditor's claim after Danny's guardianship estate asserted the action 
Consultants to Increase Medicaid Funds (Feb. 13, 2004), http://www.grassley.senate.gov/ 
releases/2004/p04r02-13.htm. 
71 See, e.g., Willingham v. McDonald, No. 96 CO 00120 (Ill. Cir. Ct. June 1996); Gean v. 
Hattaway, 330 F.3d 758 (6th Cir. 2003) (rejecting multiple legal challenges to the practice); In re 
Cajun C., 2003 WL 1901362 (Cal. App. Ct. Apr. 18,2003) (same). 
72 537 U.S. 371 (2003). 
73 Brief for Respondent at 10, KefJeler, 537 U.S. 371 (No. 01-1420), 2002 WL 31261027. 
741d 
751d 
76 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 9, at 16. 
77 Id; Joint Appendix at 45a, KefJeler, 537 U.S. 371 (No. 01-1420), 2002 WL 32102954. 
78 Brief for Respondent, supra note 73, at 10-11. 
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was barred by the anti-attachment provision of the Social Security 
Act,80 but the agency continued the administrative action.8l After 
remand from the Appeals Council, a second Administrative Law Judge 
determined that removal of Danny's grandmother as representative 
payee was improper.82 The ALJ reasoned that because Danny's current 
maintenance needs were already met through the foster care program, 
his grandmother was not required to use the Social Security benefits to 
pay for the foster care services that were already provided.83 As a result 
of the efforts by Danny's grandmother, much of his Social Security 
benefits were saved for his college education, and Danny ultimately 
graduated from Central Washington University in June 2002.84 
D. The Keffeler Decision 
During her multiple administrative appeals, Danny's grandmother 
also brought a class action in state court against DSHS to challenge the 
agency's use of foster children's Social Security benefits to reimburse 
state costs while the state agency acted as the representative payee.85 
The trial court concluded that the agency's use of OASDI and SSI 
benefits to reimburse foster care costs was in violation of the anti-
attachment provision of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 407(a), and 
the decision was upheld on appeal to the Washington Supreme Court.86 
The decision left state agencies at risk of being held liable to repay 
billions of dollars of children's Social Security Benefits.87 Amicus 
briefs in support of DSHS's appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court were 
filed by the U.S. Solicitor General, several counties, thirty-nine states, 
and several national child advocacy organizations.88 Giving 
considerable weight to the concerns raised by amici, the Supreme Court 
reversed the decision of the Washington Supreme Court in a unanimous 
decision written by Justice Souter.89 
80 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (2000). 




85 Brieffor Petitioners, supra note 9, at 16. 
86 Id. 
87 Elizabeth Oppenheim, Funding for Children in Foster Care: The Keffeler Case, 
AMERICAN PUBLIC HUMAN SERVICES ASSOCIATION, POLICY & PRACTICE, March 2003, at 23. 
88 Brieffor State of Florida et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 1; Brief 
for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 22; Brief for Counties 
of the State of California et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 22; Brief for 
Children's Defense Fund et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 22. 
89 Keffeler, 537 U.S. at 390-92. 
1812 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:4 
Justice Souter's opinion rejects the notion that a state agency 
representative payee's use of children's Social Security benefits to 
reimburse state costs is a violation of the anti-attachment provision in 
42 U.S.c. § 407(a), which generally protects Social Security benefits 
from legal actions to collect debts.90 The opinion explains that neither 
the agency's actions to become a representative payee for the children, 
nor its use of the children's Social Security benefits to reimburse state 
costs is the equivalent of an "execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, 
or other legal process" that is prohibited under § 407(a).91 After 
explaining that the agency's actions clearly did not amount to the formal 
judicial processes of execution, levy, attachment or garnishment, the 
Court also adopted a restrictive understanding of the "other legal 
process" prohibited by § 407(a), concluding that the term would, at a 
minimum, require "utilization of some judicial or quasi-judicial 
mechanism" that transfers control over property to discharge a 
liability.92 Because the agency has no enforceable claim against the 
foster children to recover state costs, the Court concluded the agency's 
actions did not meet this interpretation.93 
Although the Court primarily focused on whether the agency 
actions are prohibited by § 407(a), the Keffeler decision also addressed 
the argument that it is contrary to the foster children's best interests to 
apply their Social Security benefits to cover state costs which the 
children are not legally responsible to reimburse. Rejecting this 
argument, the Court explained that although the state agency could not 
compel the foster child or another representative payee to pay the Social 
Security benefits to the state, "that fact does not render the appointment 
of a self-reimbursing representative payee at odds with the 
Commissioner's mandate to find that a beneficiary's 'interest ... would 
be served' by the appointment. "94 The Court reasoned that the 
obligation to promote the best interests of a beneficiary does not require 
maximizing the beneficiary's resources from "leftover benefit income," 
which the Court implied would be a windfall for the children if they 
were able to receive the full amount of their Social Security benefits 
while also benefiting from state foster care expenditures.95 
In reaching these conclusions, Justice Souter's opinion placed 
significant weight on policy concerns raised by amici: Foster children 
may be worse off if states cannot apply their Social Security benefits to 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 382-85. 
92 Id. at 385. 
93 Id. at 386. 
94 Id. at 389. 
95 Id. at 389-90. The Court explained that "a representative payee serves the beneficiary's 
interest by seeing that basic needs are met, not by maximizing a trust fund attributable to 
fortuitously overlapping state and federal grants." Id. 
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reimburse state costs because state agencies would no longer be willing 
to act as representative payees, fewer children's disabilities would be 
recognized and treated, and fewer resources would be available for all 
foster children.96 These policy concerns and others not considered by 
the Supreme Court are analyzed below. 
II. THE POLlCY CONCERNS 
The practice addressed in Keffeler raises numerous policy 
questions regarding the proper use of foster children's Social Security 
benefits and how to address the tension between protecting the best 
interests of the individual foster child and promoting the common good 
of the entire population of foster children in the overburdened and far-
from-perfect foster care system.97 The questions are not easily resolved, 
as is evident by the differing opinions of child advocates. Six nationally 
known child advocacy organizations filed amicus briefs in Keffeler, four 
in support of the practices of Washington State98 and two in support of 
the class of foster care children challenging the practices.99 The 
following section of this Article provides an overview of the policy and 
practical concerns, explains flaws in the Supreme Court's analysis of 
these concerns in Keffeler, and offers support for the Article's 
conclusion that the best interests of foster children-both as individuals 
and as a class-are not being served by the current agency policies and 
practices. 
A. Eliminating the Representative Payee of Last Resort 
When the Social Security Administration selects a representative 
payee to manage a child's Social Security benefits, it is required to 
conduct an investigation to find the most preferred person or 
organization. 100 To guide the selection, federal regulations provide a 
96 Id. at 390-92. 
97 See supra notes 4, 49 and accompanying text; Robert M. Gordon, Drifting Through 
Byzantium: The Promise and Failure of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997,83 MINN. L. 
REV. 637, 679 (1999) ("Every facet of the child welfare system is now overburdened."); see also 
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-95-208, FOSTER CARE OVERVIEW, COMPLEX 
NEEDS STRAIN CAPACITY TO PROVIDE SERVICES (1995). 
98 Brieffor Children's Defense Fund et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 
22. 
99 Brief for Juvenile Law Center & the National Center on Youth Law as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents, supra note 22. 
100 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.2024, 416.624 (2005); Keffeler, 537 U.S. at 376 n.1 (noting that state 
agencies come last in order of preference for representative payees for children, and that "the 
Commissioner must also attempt to identify any other potential representative payee whose 
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prioritized list of possible representative payees for children, with state 
agencies being the least preferred. lol Thus, if the investigation is done 
appropriately and a suitable and willing parent, relative, close friend, or 
any other more preferred payee is not located, a state social services 
agency remains an option. 102 
Concern has been expressed that if state agency representative 
payees are no longer allowed to use foster children's Social Security 
benefits to reimburse state costs, the lack of financial incentive may 
cause a significant decline in the agencies' willingness to serve as the 
representative payee of last resort and thus children may not be able to 
receive their Social Security benefits.103 The Supreme Court placed 
considerable weight on this concern in reaching its conclusions in 
Keffeler, explaining that "[i]f respondents had their way, however, 
public offices like [the state agency] might well not be there to serve as 
payees even as the last resort" and as a result "many eligible children 
would either obtain no Social Security benefits or need some very good 
luck to get them."I04 
The reasoning is flawed when considered in light of practical truths 
and the inherent responsibilities of foster care agencies. First, the Court 
failed to understand the bureaucratic reality in which foster children 
live. The Court incorrectly assumes that state agencies only apply to 
become representative payees when they believe no one else is available 
and that the Social Security Administration adequately performs its 
investigatory function to ensure there are no other better-suited choices. 
Rather, there is an automatic process under which the state foster care 
agency is virtually always selected as representative payee without any 
serious investigative attempt to locate a more preferred payee.105 In 
many if not most of these cases, there are likely other more preferred 
individuals or organizations available to serve as representative payees 
who are not properly considered under the inadequate investigation and 
application process. 106 
appointment may be preferred"). 
101 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.2021(c), 416.621(c) (2005). 
102 Id.; see Daniel L. Skoler & Amy L. Allbright, Judicial OverSight of the Nation's Largest 
Guardianship System: Caselaw on Social Security Administration Representative Payee Issues, 
24 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REp. 169, 170-71 (2000) (presenting an overview of 
state court decisions regarding the Social Security Administration's duties in investigating and 
selecting representative payees). 
103 Brief for Children's Defense Fund et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 
22, at 21-22; see also Keffeler, 537 U.S. at 391 n.13 (noting that the Washington foster fare 
agency has stated that it would not seek to become representative payee for SSI beneficiaries 
without the ability to use the benefits to reimburse state costs). 
104 Keffeler, 537 U.S. at 391. 
105 See infra notes 205-209 and accompanying text. 
106 See itifra notes 205-209 and accompanying text. 
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Second, the Court's acceptance of the assertion that foster care 
agencies will no longer serve as representative payees if they cannot 
take the children's benefits ignores the agencies' inherent 
responsibilities and the very purpose of their existence-to serve and 
protect the best interests of children in foster care.107 An analogous 
situation provides an instructive comparison. Several state and county 
agencies act as representative payees for disabled adults without the 
financial incentive of applying the adults' Social Security benefits to 
state costS.108 Some of these agencies charge a $25 monthly fee that is 
allowed by the Social Security Administration,109 but the remaining 
benefits are used for the benefit of the beneficiaries, not the state. Thus, 
without the incentive of taking the benefits from those served, the 
agencies serving disabled adults display a willingness to provide this 
needed representative payee service simply as a part of their 
governmental function and purpose in serving their client population. 
Third, in asserting that eligible children may not receive their 
Social Security benefits if a state agency is no longer willing to serve as 
representative payee, I \0 the Supreme Court overlooks the Social 
Security Administration's duty to investigate and locate a suitable 
representative payee, and that the duty does not simply cease if a state 
agency declines the responsibility .111 The payment of Social Security 
payments may be temporarily delayed until a representative payee is 
located, but the child's eligibility does not end. 1l2 The benefits will be 
conserved and then paid out once a suitable representative payee is 
chosen. I 13 
\07 See, e.g., Miller v. Martin, 838 So. 2d 761 (La. 2003) (holding that when the foster care 
agency is entrusted with the custody of foster children, the agency has a nondelegable duty of 
care and protection to the children); MD CODE ANN., FAMILY LAW § 5-525 (2005) (explaining 
that the foster care agency shall "concurrently develop and implement a permanency plan that is 
in the best interests of the child" and "shall provide 24-hour a day care and supportive services for 
a child who is committed to its custody or guardianship in an out-of-home placement"); see 
generally Michele Benedetto, An Ounce of Prevention: A Foster Youth's Substantive Due 
Process Right to Proper Preparation for Emancipation, 9 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL'y 381 
(2005). 
108 See, e.g., PORTLAND MAINE HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. DEP'T, REPRESENTATIVE 
PAYEE PROGRAM, http://www.ci.portland.me.us/hhs/ssreppayee.asp (last visited Jan. 10, 2006); 
SCOTT COUNTY IOWA COMMUNITY SERVS., REPRESENTATIVE PAYEE PROGRAM, 
http://www.scottcountyiowa.com!community/repres-payee.php (last visited Jan. 10, 2006); 
BUNCOMBE COUNTY NORTH CAROLINA DEP'T OF SOCIAL SERVS., ADULT SOCIAL SERVICES: 
REPRESENTATIVE PAYEE, http://www.buncombecounty.org/goveming/depts/dss/adults/ 
payee.htm (last visited Jan. 10,2006). 
109 42 U.S.C. § 1383(a)(2)(D) (2000); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.2040(a), 416.640(a) (2005). 
110 Wash. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 
371,391 (2003). 
III 20 C.F.R. § 404.2011 (2005). 
112 !d. 
113 Id. 
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Finally, the state agency is not necessarily the representative payee 
of last resort for foster children. Although the relevant regulations list 
an "authorized social agency or custodial institution" last in the list of 
preferred representative payees, the regulations explain that the list is 
flexible, imply that it is not exclusive, and state that the primary concern 
is simply "to select the payee who will best serve the beneficiary's 
interest."114 The Social Security Administration's Program Operations 
Manual System (POMS), the detailed instructions that guide the 
practices of Social Security Administration staff, liS further explains that 
there is a need for flexibility and that the Administration should 
consider other possible representative payees not listed in the 
preferences. 116 Several other possibilities exist. For example, volunteer 
representative payee programs have been developed through non-profit 
organizations and state and local government agencies in which 
volunteers agree to serve as representative payees for adult beneficiaries 
who require the service but do not have family members or friends 
available. I 17 Similar programs could be created, or existing programs 
expanded, to provide the same service to foster children. Also, several 
organizations provide representative payee services for a small fee. 118 
From the children's perspective, virtually any person or organization 
would be preferable to the state agencies because non-agency 
representative payees cannot be required to expend the children's 
benefits to reimburse state costS.119 Rather, like Danny Keffeler's 
grandmother, the payees can exercise their discretion as fiduciaries to 
use the benefits for current needs not met through the foster care 
program or to conserve the benefits for the children's future needs. 
114 /d. §§ 404.202 I (c), 416.621(c). 
115 See Keffeler, 537 U.S. at 385 (providing an explanation of the POMS and noting that while 
they "are not products of fonnal rulemaking, they nevertheless warrant respect ... "). 
116 The POMS explain that the Administration should also consider "[a]nyone not listed above 
who shows strong concern for the child, is qualified, and able to act as payee, and who is willing 
to do so." POMS § GN 00502.105(8), available al hup://policy.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx! 
0200502105!opendocument (last visited Feb. 16,2006). 
117 See, e.g., Bread for the City, The Representative Payee Program, Washington D.C., 
http://www.breadforthecity.org/rpp/index.html(last visited Jan. 10, 2006); MARYLAND DEP'T OF 
HUMAN RESOURCES, OFFICE OF ADULT SERVICES, REPRESENTATIVE PAYEE PROGRAM, 
http://www.dhr.state.md.us/oas/payee.htrn (last visited Jan. 10, 2006); CITY OF PORTLAND, 
MAINE, REPRESENTATIVE PAYEE PROGRAM, http://www.portlandmaine.govlhhs/ssreppayee.asp 
(last visited Jan. 10, 2006). 
118 See, e.g., Benefit Payee Services, Inc., Denver, Colorado, http://www.geocities.com/ 
jsmith_2645/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2006); Systems Unlimited, Representative Payee & Financial 
Services, Iowa City, Iowa, http://www.sui.org/payee-services.htrn (last visited Jan. 10, 2006). 
119 Keffeler, 537 U.S. at 389; see Farrell, supra note 33, at 335-36 (suggesting additional 
options for increasing the use of nonprofit organizations, public guardians and private volunteer 
organizations to provide representative payee services). 
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B. Screening Children for SSI Eligibility 
The ability to convert children's Social Security benefits into a 
state funding stream is a powerful incentive for states to help as many 
children as possible to become eligible for benefits. If the incentive is 
removed and state agencies can no longer use foster children's benefits 
to reimburse state foster care costs, the agencies may reduce their efforts 
to help more children initially qualify for Social Security benefits.120 If 
fewer foster children go through the SSI screening process, it is likely 
that fewer children's disabilities and special needs will be recognized or 
addressed. 121 
Although the concern is real, there are better methods than bribing 
the state agencies with the children's Social Security benefits for 
addressing the need to increase screening of foster children for 
disabilities and corresponding special needs. In Section IV, this Article 
provides a suggested reform to realign the interaction of federal foster 
care (IV -E) benefits and SSI benefits in a manner that would incentivize 
state agencies to help children apply for SSI without allowing the 
agencies to take the resulting benefits. Also, several federal laws 
already require such health screening and treatment services. For 
example, foster care children are entitled to Early and Periodic 
Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment (EPSDT) services under Medicaid, 
which include comprehensive medical screenings and necessary 
treatment for physical and mental health conditions. 122 The Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) requires state school districts to 
identify, assess, and treat children with disabilities related to 
education.123 Also, provisions of the Adoption Assistance and Child 
Welfare Act of 1980124 and the Adoption and Safe Families Act l25 
require states to have standards and plans to ensure foster children are 
provided quality services to protect the children's health and safety.126 
120 Brieffor Children's Defense Fund et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 
22, at 22; Keffeler, 537 U.S. at 390-9\. 
121 See supra note 120. 
122 42 U.S.C. § 1396a-1396d (2000); see Bohr, supra note 50, at 910-13 (discussing EPSDT 
requirements and the fact that foster children are often not receiving the required services); Sara 
Rosenbaum, Anne Markus, & Colleen Sonosky, Public Health Insurance Design for Children: 
The Evolution from Medicaid to SCHIP, I J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. I, 12-16 (2004) 
(discussing the scope of required EPSDT services); Gardner, supra note 25, at 9 (discussing 
EPSDT requirements for foster children). 
123 20 U.S.c. §§ 1400-1474 (2000). See generally Sharon C. Streett, The Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 35 (1996) (providing a general 
overview of what the IDEA requires of school districts and what remedies are available). 
124 Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 
(1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-28, 670-79 (2000)). 
125 Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) 
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.c.). 
126 See Bohr, supra note 50, at 907. See generally Cristina Chi-Young Chou, Renewing the 
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C. Resources for Foster Children: Individual Rights vs. the 
Common Good 
Because state child welfare programs are dramatically under-
funded,127 it can be argued that foster children as a class benefit from 
the practice of taking Social Security benefits from individual foster 
children to reimburse state costs. Although individual children are 
deprived of resources, more resources may be available for all children. 
If state agencies can no longer use individual foster children's Social 
Security benefits as a source of revenue to fund foster care services, 
foster children as a class may be harmed. 128 The Supreme Court found 
this theory persuasive,129 but failed to address the real underlying policy 
question: Do the harsh realities of the under-funded foster care system 
rationalize a policy of taking Social Security benefits from those 
individual foster children who may have the greatest needs in order to 
increase state funding available for all foster children? 
This trade-off is bad policy and a bad bargain for foster children. 
First, foster children as a class receive little benefit. The Social Security 
benefits taken from foster children amount to less than one percent of 
the total reported state foster care funding.130 Further, the state savings 
that result from the practice do not necessarily translate into additional 
services to foster care children. Using the children's Social Security 
benefits to pay foster care costs reduces the amount state legislatures 
would otherwise have to appropriate to foster care agencies for the 
expenses. The additional state funds resulting from the savings can 
certainly be used to provide additional or improved foster care services, 
but the savings can also be used for any other purpose.131 Thus, state 
Good Intentions of Foster Care: Enforcement of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act 
of 1980 and the Substantive Due Process Right to Safety, 46 VAND. L. REv. 683 (1993). 
127 See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
128 Brief for Children's Defense Fund et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 
22, at 22. 
129 Wash. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 
371,391 (2003). 
130 See generally SCARCELLA ET AL., supra note 46. 
131 Id. at 28 ("[I]f the child were eligible for survivor's benefits, the state's portion of the 
payment could be decreased by the amount of the survivor benefits, saving state dollars for other 
purposes, including child welfare activities."); see also MARYLAND DEP'T OF HUMAN 
RESOURCES, SOC. SERVS. ADMINISTRATION, TITLE IV-E FOSTER CARE & SUBSIDIZED 
ADOPTION PROGRAM, www.dhr.state.md.us/ssa/pdfs/4eone.pdf. Rather than explaining that the 
state agency practice of applying children's social security benefits to offset state costs can lead to 
additional foster care services for all children, the practice is simply described as a savings to the 
state general fund: 
As the custodial parent of [Ooster children, the Department is entitled to become the 
representative payee .... As of June 30, 1999,586 foster children committed to the 
Department were in receipt of SSI benefits. This represents total potential annualized 
savings to the General Fund in excess of $3.5 million (586 foster children receiving 
881 x $500 881 benefit/month x 12 months/year). 
2006] PAYING FOR FOSTER CARE 1819 
savings from using children's Social Security benefits to pay foster care 
costs may just as likely be used to fund a new highway or to help 
finance a new baseball stadium as to hire new foster care social 
workers. 
Also, while foster children as a class are receiving little benefit 
from the trade-off, the individual foster children are losing out by 
having their Social Security benefits taken. When the state agencies 
become their representative payees, the children's benefits are simply 
used to replenish the state coffers rather than to address the children's 
current or future needs. Had DSHS been successful in stopping Danny 
Keffeler's grandmother from acting as his representative payee, Danny 
m~ght not have been able to afford college. 132 
Thus, the trade-off results in significant harm to the individual 
foster children and provides little benefit to the class of all foster 
children. Moreover, even if protections are implemented to ensure 
children's Social Security benefits taken by state agencies are only used 
to fund foster care services, the simple conclusion cannot be escaped 
that foster children should not be required to pay for their own care. As 
the Supreme Court has often explained, the practice of Government 
should not force "some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all 
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."133 
D. SSI Resource Limit 
Eligibility for SSI is based upon financial need, including a $2000 
asset limit. 134 If a foster child receives SSI and unused benefits accrue 
to more than $2000, the child may no longer be eligible for benefits. 
When a state agency applies a child's SSI benefits to repay state costs, 
the practice acts as mechanism to ensure the child's benefits do not pass 
the $2000 accrued asset limit. 135 Thus, the Supreme Court expressed 
concern that if the practice stops, the foster children's assets will "creep 
above" the asset limit and their eligibility will terminate. 136 The Court 
failed to consider several other options. 
Id. 
132 See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
\33 See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 125 S.Ct. 2074, 2080 (2005) (citing Armstrong v. 
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)); Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l 
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 336 (2002) (same); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 
618 (2001) (same). 
134 20 C.F.R. § 416.1205(c) (2005). Unlike SSI, there is no asset limit for OASDI eligibility 
(Social Security benefits based upon parent's death or disability). Therefore, the asset limit is not 
a concern for foster children like Danny Keffeler who receive OASDI benefits. 
135 Wash. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 
371,390 (2003). 
136 Id. 
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A representative payee's fiduciary obligation to manage SSI 
payments in the beneficiary's best interests includes the responsibility to 
ensure that benefit payments are not terminated because accumulated 
benefits surpass the asset limit. 137 If the accrued payments approach the 
$2000 limit, the benefits should be properly used to ensure continuing 
eligibility. 138 The Supreme Court apparently embraced a theory that 
available uses of the SSI benefits other than to reimburse the state 
agencies will not be sufficient to avoid the asset limit. However, an 
unending list of possible uses is not difficult to contemplate-uses that 
provide a direct benefit to the disabled foster children as opposed to 
simply handing over the money to the state to reimburse costs for which 
the children have no legal obligation. 139 The Court also failed to 
consider several exceptions to the resource limit that foster children 
could utilize to meet special needs or to plan for future independence. 
For example, resources that are not counted towards the asset limit 
include funds placed in a special needs trust,140 benefits received under 
an approved Plan for Achieving Self Support (PASS),141 household 
items and personal effects,142 an ownership interest in a home,143 and 
137 See SOc. SEC. ADMIN., LESSON PLAN, TRAINING ORGANIZATIONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
PAYEES, available at http://www.ssa.gov/payeelLessonPlanORGTGNGUIDEfinalnumber 
10.htm#SSILIMIT: 
Id. 
As an organizational payee, you should know when a beneficiary's 
resources ... approach the $2,000 limit. You should attempt to find out if they have 
extra needs. . . . You should make the purchase now when the resources are available. 
If excess resources do accumulate, the beneficiary will no longer be eligible for SSI 
payments. . . . Some organizations flag the accounts of SSI beneficiaries when 
conserved funds reach $1,500. This serves as an alert to assess the personal needs of 
the beneficiary and maintain countable resources below the $2,000 limit by meeting 
these needs. 
138 Id. 
139 For example, the Baltimore City Department of Social Services provides such a list in its 
standard operating procedures for ensuring that children's accumulated SSI benefits do not 
exceed to $2000 limit. The policy directs case managers that "[i]tems which may be purchased 
include, but are not limited to: psychiatric evaluations and treatment; psychological testing; 
clothing; medicine; recreation, i.e. camps; vocational training; furniture; dental or optical care; 
day care; educational needs, i.e. computers, books, uniforms, tuition; rent/security deposits and 
utilities for teens" Letter from Yvonne Gilchrist, Director, Baltimore City Department of Social 
Services, attachment 4 (Mar. 15, 2001) (on file with author). 
140 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(A) (2000). See generally Joseph A. Rosenberg, Supplemental 
Needs Trnsts for People with Disabilities: The Development of a Private Trnst in the Public 
Interest, 10 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 91 (2000); Joel A. Mendler, Using Trnsts for Disabled Clients: 
Preserving Governmental Benefits, 44 LA. BJ. 26 (1996). 
141 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1225-416.1226 (2005). See generally Sarah H. Bohr, Evaluating 
Children Seeking SSI and Sheltering Benefits in Trnsts, 41 Soc. SEC. REp. SERVo 711 (1993) 
(discussing the use of PASS programs for children); James R. Sheldon, Jr. & Edwin J. Lopez-
Soto, PASS: Supplemental Security Income's Plan for Achieving Self-Support, 30 
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 1101 (Mar.-Apr. 1997). 
142 20 C.F.R. § 416.1216 (2005). 
143 Id. 
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ownership of an automobile. l44 Anyone of these options could be 
utilized to help foster children plan for their transition out of foster care 
while avoiding the $2000 resource limit. Representative payees are 
appointed to make precisely these choices-to navigate the landscape of 
complex eligibility issues and the countless choices for using benefits, 
and to make decisions in a manner that best serves the individualized 
interests of beneficiaries. 
E. The "Penetration Rate" and the Interaction of Social Security and 
IV-E Foster Care Benefits 
Further complicating the policy considerations are the interactions 
between a foster child's potential receipt of both federal foster care 
benefits (Title IV-E benefits) and Social Security benefits. When a 
child is placed in the home of a licensed foster care parent or foster care 
group home, the state pays an established monthly rate to the care 
provider. These state foster care payments are made "without strings 
attached," meaning a child has no obligation to repay the state for the 
benefits and the benefits are provided regardless of the economic 
situation of the household from which the child was removed. 145 
Through the Foster Care and Adoption Assistance program in Title IV-
E of the Social Security Act,146 the state may then receive partial 
reimbursement for the payments if the child is eligible for the IV-E 
benefits under a complex set of regulations. 147 To receive this federal 
reimbursement, states have a strong incentive to find ways to increase 
the percentage of foster children determined IV-E eligible. Therefore, 
with the assistance of private revenue maximization consultants as 
discussed in section LB, the states set target percentages, termed 
"penetration rates," as goals for maximizing the number of children in 
foster children eligible for IV -E reimbursement. 148 
144 [d. 
145 Wash. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 
371,378,382 (2003). 
146 42 U.S.c. §§ 670-679b (2000). 
147 45 C.F.R. §§ 1356.10-1356.71(2005). 
148 See, e.g., WISCONSIN DEP'T OF HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVS., TITLE 1V-E FEDERAL 
FUNDING OVERVIEW, http://www.dhfs.state.wi.us/ChildrenlTitleIV-E/progservlFedGov 
FundingPortion.HTM ("Frequently, the percentage of IV-E eligible children is referred to as the 
state's IV-E 'penetration rate."'); WASHINGTON DEP'T OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVS., 
DECISION PACKAGE, DP CODE/TITLE: M2-AD TITLE IV-E STATE AND FEDERAL SWITCH, 
http://wwwI.dshs.wa.gov/pdflFSAl2004_Supplemental_ Budget/CA _ M2 _ ADTitleIV _ E _State 
FederalSwitch.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2006). This is budget document that explains the 
Children's Administration (CA) staff 
have been working to increase the Title IV-E penetration rate. As a result, CA has been 
able to increase the number of IV-E eligible children and decrease the total children 
counted, thus increasing the penetration rate from an average of 37 percent to an 
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The complexity of TV-E eligibility determinations is compounded 
when a foster child is also eligible for Social Security benefits. If a 
child is disabled and eligible to receive SSI, concurrent receipt of SSI 
and IV -E benefits is possible.149 However, because the Social Security 
Administration has determined that IV-E benefits are "income based on 
need" to the child, the receipt of IV-E benefits result in a dollar-for-
dollar reduction in the SSI benefits.150 
As a result of this interaction, a number of questions arise. F or a 
child eligible for both SSI and IV-E, how should the decision to apply 
on a child's behalf for one or both of the benefits be made, and who 
should decide? Federal guidance explains the child's best interests 
should control the decision and implies that someone other than the 
state agency should decide: "Information regarding the benefits 
available under each program should be made available by the State title 
IV -E agency so that an informed choice can be made in the child's best 
interests."151 However, ignoring the federal guidance, some state 
policies leave the choice to the state agency based upon what brings in 
the most money to the state rather than which choice is in the best 
interests of the child. 152 
Were the decision left to someone acting in the best interests of the 
foster children, the rational choice would be to choose the SSI over the 
IV-E benefits. Although IV-E benefits are considered "income based 
on need" to children, the children do not receive any direct payment. 
Id. 
average of 55 percent per year. The increase in the penetration rate has resulted in an 
increase in Title IV-E, which will enable CA to switch approximately $15 million 
($7.5 million per year) General Fund-State to General Fund-Federal. 
149 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERYS., ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN AND 
FAMILIES, CHILD WELFARE POLICY MANUAL, 8.4D, TITLE IV-E, GENERAL TITLE IV-E 
REQUIREMENTS, CONCURRENT RECEIPT OF FEDERAL BENEFITS, http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/ 
programs/cb/lawsyolicies/laws/cwprn/policy _ dsp.jsp?citlD=76 (last visited Feb. 16, 2006). 
150 Id. However, there is an exception to this policy for certain Title IV-E independent living 
benefits provided to help foster children in the transition to independence. Because the benefits 
are not considered income based on need, foster children can receive both the independent living 
benefits and the full amount of the SSI benefits. POMS, supra note 14, § SI 00830.410, available 
at http://policy.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0500830410. 
151 U.S. DEP'TOF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERYS., supra note 149. 
152 See, e.g., OR. ADMIN. R. 413-100-0330 (2005) ("The agency must make a determination of 
which funding source is of most financial benefit to the agency."); STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, 
INTER-DEPARTMENT COMMUNICATION, PD 98-11, CONCURRENT ELIGIBILITY FOR SSI AND 
TITLE IV-E FOSTER CARE PAYMENTS, May 1, 1998, available at 
http://www.dhhs.state.nh.us/SR_htrnlpd_98-ll_dated_05_98.htrn: 
Id. 
The difference between SSI and Title IV-E must be considered carefully by the 
decision maker (CPSW/JSO/case technician) when choosing whether to apply for 
either or both Title IV -E or SSI benefits on behalf of the child. Circumstances for each 
child must be evaluated. . .. The child's SSI benefit amount, the child's foster care 
payment, and the child's expected length of stay in a foster care placement must be 
considered. The fiscal impact on DCYF must also be taken into consideration. 
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Rather, the IV-E benefits reimburse the states for foster care payments 
already made on behalf of eligible children to their foster care 
providers. 153 The children receive the state foster care services 
regardless of whether the state receives the IV -E reimbursement. 154 
SSI, in contrast, does provide direct benefit payments to the children, 
and if the children are able to have a representative payee appointed 
other than a state agency, it is possible that the SSI benefits can be used 
for special needs not met by the foster care services or conserved for 
future needs. 
If all children were able to decline IV -E benefits in favor of SSI 
and use the SSI for their own needs rather than to reimburse state costs, 
the result would be a reduction of federal benefits (either IV-E or SSI) 
available for use by state foster care programs. Such a decline in 
available federal funds would clearly be a concern to already under-
funded state foster care programs. However, the practice of using foster 
children as a tool to achieve target "penetration rates"-thereby placing 
the state's fiscal interests over the individual interests of the children-
is equally if not more concerning. Recommendations in section IV.B 
address this tension. 
F. Poor Performance and Oversight o/State Agency 
Representative Payees 
To provide assurances to any Supreme Court Justices who may 
have had concerns with the agency practices in Keffeler, the amicus 
brief of several California counties points to audits of agency 
representative payees by the Social Security Administration as a 
safeguard that ensures compliance with statutory and regulatory 
obligations: "the Administration's Office of Inspector General has 
conducted at least 19 audits of local social service agencies' actions as 
representative payee since 1997. Accordingly, the amici curiae have 
complied with the Act and their programs have been approved of by the 
Administration."155 The amici portray the fact of the audits as a stamp-
of-approval by the Social Security Administration. 156 The assertion that 
the Social Security Administration's Office of Inspector General (OIG) 
has conducted numerous audits of state agency representative payees is 
153 Libby S. Adler, The Meanings of Permanence: A Critical Analysis of the Adoption and 
Safe Families Act of 1997,38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1,20-21 (2001). 
154 Wash. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 
371,378 (2003) (noting that the "department provides foster care without strings attached to any 
child who needs it"). 
155 Brief for Counties of the State of California et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
supra note 22, at 7. 
156 1d. 
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correct. However, the amici and the Supreme Court both failed to 
address the audits' results. 
1. Example Audit of an Organizational Representative Payee 
Receiving a Poor Review: Baltimore City 
Department of Social Services 
According to its 2001 audit by the OIG, the Baltimore City 
Department of Social Services (BCDSS) has not adequately performed 
its duties as representative payee. IS? Record keeping and proper 
accounting practices were virtually nonexistent,158 and BCDS S may 
have improperly spent children's funds. 159 As of August 2000, BCDSS 
records showed $864,000 in conserved funds owed to 290 beneficiaries 
no longer in state care, and the agency had taken no action to pay the 
conserved funds to the affected beneficiaries. 16o In more than twenty-
five percent of the cases reviewed, the children were no longer in 
BCDSS's care, but the agency continued to receive and spend the 
benefit payments as representative payee. 161 As a result of the audit, the 
Office of Inspector General referred numerous cases for representative 
payee misuse determinations. 162 Although a determination of misuse 
normally means a payee is no longer considered suitable to provide 
representative payee services,163 BCDSS continues to act as the 
representative payee for foster children in its care. 164 
157 Soc. SEC. ADMIN., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, FINANCIAL-RELATED AUDIT OF 
THE BALTIMORE CITY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES-AN ORGANIZATIONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE PAYEE FOR THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, A-13-00-10066 (Sept. 
2001), http://www.ssa.gov/oig/ ADOBEPDFIA-13-00-10066.pdf [hereinafter BALTIMORE CITY 
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES AUDIT REpORT]. 
158 The agency completely failed to record, or incorrectly recorded, benefit receipts and/or 
disbursements in 82% of the records reviewed. Id. at 4. 
159 1.6 million in beneficiary-conserved funds should have been deposited in beneficiaries' 
savings accounts, but were inappropriately maintained in the agency's general funds. Id. at iii. 
160 Id. at 9. 
161 Id. at 8. 
162 Id. (finding that the concern was noted in thirteen out of a random sample of fifty 
beneficiaries' cases). 
163 POMS, supra note 14, § GN 00604.045, available at http://policy.ssa.gov/ poms.nsfllnxl 
0200604045!opendocument (last visited Feb. 16,2006). 
164 Telephone Interview with Jim Becker, Baltimore City Department of Social Services, 
Division of Legal Services (Feb. 6, 2006) (confirming that BCDSS continues to serve as 
representative payee for foster children). 
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2. Example Audit of an Organizational Representative Payee 
Receiving a Favorable Review: San Francisco 
Department of Human Services 
1825 
Compared to the poor audit results received by the Baltimore City 
Department of Social Services, the San Francisco Department of 
Human Services (SFDHS) received one of the more favorable 
reviews. 165 However, the audit reveals that even this agency 
representative payee that received good marks from the OIG has not 
performed its duties in a manner instilling trust that the interests of 
foster children are being properly served. SFDHS failed to maintain a 
detailed accounting of the benefits received and disbursed for the foster 
children for whom it acted as representative payee. 166 The agency failed 
to conserve excess funds of the beneficiaries,167 and inappropriately 
titled the checking account for foster care children's benefits to show 
that the funds belonged to the state agency rather than to the children. 168 
Further, SFDHS failed to report changes in custody for its beneficiaries 
which resulted in the agency receiving benefit payments for child 
beneficiaries no longer in the agency's care. 169 
3. Monitoring Representative Payees: A Safeguard in Name Only 
Poor performance of organizational representative payees may 
often go undetected since the Social Security Administration is not 
monitoring the agencies' practices well. A 1996 audit found that the 
Social Security Administration was not collecting the required 
representative payee accounting reports for approximately $1.2 billion 
in annual benefits, and that agencies and institutions were the most 
common high-volume non-responding payees. 170 Also, a 2002 OIG 
165 The 2003 audit by OIG concluded that SFDHS "had effective safeguards over the receipt 
and disbursement of Social Security benefits," and the agency "ensured Social Security benefits 
were used in accordance with SSA's policies and procedures." Soc. SEC. ADMIN., OFFICE OF 
THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, SAN FRANCISCO DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES-AN 
ORGANIZATIONAL REPRESENTATIVE PAYEE FOR THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 
AUDIT REpORT, A-09-03-13011, at 2-3 (Nov. 2003), http://www.ssa.gov/oig/ADOBEPDF/A-09-
03-13011.pdf [hereinafter SAN FRANCISCO DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES AUDIT REPORT]. 
166 Id. at 9-10. 
167 Id. at 8-9. 
168 The agency established the checking account for foster children's benefits as part of the 
general fund for the City and County of San Francisco, rather than a trust or custodian account, in 
violation of the requirement that representative payees should not commingle a beneficiary's 
funds with their personal or organizational operating funds. Id. at 10. 
169 !d. at 5. 
170 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, MONITORING REPRESENTATIVE 
PAYEE PERFORMANCE: NON-RESPONDING PAYEES, A-09-96-64208 (Dec. 1996), 
http://www.ssa.gov/oig/ADOBEPDF/audit_htms/96-64208.htm. 
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analysis found significant problems with the SSA's monitoring and 
oversight of benefit misuse by representative payees. 171 OIG reviewed 
670 cases with documented misuse amounts of over $5000 and 
determined that seventy-eight percent of those cases were not properly 
referred to the OIG for possible criminal, civil, or administrative 
remedies.172 The Social Security Administration frequently retained 
representative payees after determining they had misused benefit 
payments,173 and those retained representative payees rarely made the 
mandatory repayment of misused benefits. 174 
Thus, a review of the OIG audits and reports does not provide 
assurances, but reveals that state agencies are using foster children's 
Social Security benefits to reimburse state costs in a context of systemic 
and unchecked noncompliance with statutory and regulatory 
obligations. According to the view of Social Security Administration 
staff, the entire representative payee system is "fundamentally 
flawed."175 In addition to the need for thorough policy deliberations to 
improve this system in which foster children's Social Security benefits 
are managed, litigation strategies should be developed and pursued to 
bring pressure for reform upon a system that has refused to fix itself. 
III. UNANSWERED LEGAL QUESTIONS AFTER KEFFELER 
Section 405U) of the Social Security Act governs the selection and 
duties of representative payees. 176 Section 407(a) of the Act, the anti-
attachment provision, protects Social Security benefits from "execution, 
levy, attachment, garnishment, orother legal process."177 The Supreme 
Court's decision in Keffeler addressed the limited question of whether 
the process of a state agency applying to become a representative payee 
for foster children, and then using the children's Social Security benefits 
to reimburse state costs, is a violation of § 407(a).178 The Court 
171 Soc. SEC. ADMIN., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION 
CONCERNING REPRESENTATIVE PAYEE MISUSE OF BENEFICIARIES' PAYMENTS, A-13-01-11004 
(June 2002), http://www.ssa.gov/oig/ADOBEPDF/A-13-01-11004.pdf. 
172 Jd at 4-5. 
173 ld. at 6. 
174 A review of the recovery status of misused benefits as of September 2000 found that only 
1.3% of misused benefits were fully repaid by those representative payees who were retained by 
SSA after misuse determinations. ld. 
175 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, MONITORING REPRESENTATIVE 
PAYEE PERFORMANCE: MANAGEMENT AND STAFF SURVEY, A-09-96-64212, at 4 (Feb. 1997), 
http://www.ssa.gov/oig/ADOBEPDF/A-09-96-64212.pdf. 
176 42 U.S.C § 405(j) (2000). 
177 Id. § 407(a). 
178 Wash. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 
371,375 (2003). 
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recognized that foster children may have other constitutional and 
statutory claims to challenge the practice, including arguments under § 
4050), but declined to reach such arguments. 179 This section addresses 
several possible legal arguments and questions left unresolved by the 
Supreme Court.180 
A. The Representative Payee as Fiduciary: 
Discretion vs. Fixed Rules 
Under § 405(j) of the Social Security Act, representative payees 
have fiduciary obligations to beneficiaries. 181 In Keffeler, the state 
agency's fiduciary obligations to foster children came into conflict with 
the state's pecuniary self-interests in seeking to maximize federal funds. 
The Supreme Court recognized the self-interested behavior of the state 
agency but did not resolve the conflict within the context of the 
agency's fiduciary duties. Concluding that the use of foster children's 
Social Security benefits to reimburse state costs is permissible, the 
Court concluded that "the appointment of a self-reimbursing 
representative payee" is not "at odds with the Commissioner's mandate" 
to serve the interests of the beneficiary .182 
The Court's conclusion contradicts the centuries-old fiduciary duty 
of loyalty,183 which encompasses the negative duty to "do no harm,"184 
and the broader and affirmative fiduciary duty of care. 18S Fiduciaries 
have "an obligation to refrain from self-interested behavior that 
constitutes a wrong to the beneficiary as a result of the fiduciary 
exercising discretion with respect to the beneficiary's critical 
resources. "186 
The Court's failure to properly resolve the conflict within the 
framework of fiduciary law creates a paradoxical scenario. While the 
state as creditor is prevented from doing harm, the state as fiduciary is 
179 [d. at 380 n.4, 390 n.12 (explaining that the arguments were not addressed by the lower 
court and "are far afield of the question on which we granted certiorari."). 
180 This is not intended to be an exhaustive list but rather an analysis of some of the legal 
arguments I believe are the most compelling. Other legal challenges have been raised in litigation 
that I do not address here. For example, the Sixth Circuit determined a challenge to the practice 
under the Rehabilitation Act was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss in Gean v. Hattaway, 
330 F.3d 758, 774-76 (6th Cir. 2003). 
181 See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text. 
182 Keffeler, 537 U.S. at 389. 
183 Arthur B. Laby, Resolving Conflicts of Duty in Fiduciary Relationships, 54 AM. U. L. REv. 
75,99-109 (2004). 
184 [d. at 125. 
185 [d. at 109-25. 
186 D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REv. 
1399, 1407 (2002). 
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free to do so. A state agency would be prohibited from attaching the 
children's Social Security benefits if the agency was acting as a creditor 
trying to collect on a debt. 187 However, once cloaked in the fiduciary 
role of representative payee, the agency can decide to use the children's 
benefits to reimburse state costs for which the children have no legal 
obligation. 
Moreover, although the Supreme Court concluded that state agency 
representative payees have discretion to use foster children's Social 
Security benefits to reimburse state costs as a form of current 
maintenance, the Court did not address the manner in which the 
discretionary power is being exercised. 188 The state agencies are 
applying blanket rules rather than making decisions based upon the 
individual circumstances of foster children. Under the direction of 
statutes, regulations, and policy manuals, state agencies acting as 
representative payees for foster children are required to apply the 
children's Social Security benefits to reimburse state costS.189 The 
individualized needs of foster children are not considered. 
This practice is not consistent with a representative payee's 
discretionary authority, which requires a payee to exercise independent 
judgment and to use the Social Security benefits in a manner the payee 
determines "to be in the best interests of the beneficiary."19o The 
exercise of this discretion requires the weighing of individual 
circumstances and available options. Whereas strong arguments can be 
187 KefJeler, 537 U.S. at 382. 
188 Id. at 390 n.12. 
189 Such blanket rules exist in several states. For example, a regulation directs the Maryland 
foster care agency how to treat a foster child's Social Security benefits (or any other resources 
belonging to the child): "The child's resources shall be applied directly to the cost of care .... " 
No exceptions or opportunities to exercise discretion are provided unless the state costs of care 
have already been paid and excess children's resources remain. MD. CODE REGS. 7.2.11.26(L) 
(2005) (emphasis added). In North Carolina, the state policy manual directs local offices and 
staff that 
[t]he county DSS must be aware of all resources available to a child, which may 
include a child's unearned income from sources such as Supplemental Security 
Income, Social Security Survivor's benefits, trust funds, endowments, or child support 
paid directly to the agency. When a child is IV-E eligible, the agency must use the 
child's resources as part of the cost of care .... 
NORTH CAROLINA DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., DIVISION OF SOCIAL SERVICES 
MANUAL, CHAPTER IV: 1203 FOSTER CARE FUNDING § IV(C), http://info.dhhs.state.nc.us/olml 
manuals/dss/csm-20/man/CSsI203-09.htm. In Los Angeles, the Foster Care Eligibility 
Handbook directs the agency to become the representative payee for foster children receiving 
Social Security benefits, and that "this income must be applied toward the placement costs." LOs 
ANGELES COUNTY DEP'T OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVS., FOSTER CARE ELIGIBILITY 
HANDBOOK, E080-0620, http://dcfs.co.la.ca.us/PolicylHndbook%20FCEIE0801E080-0620.doc 
(last visited Feb. 16,2006) (emphasis added). 
190 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.2035(a), 416.635(a) (2005); see POMS, supra note 14, § GN 00602.001, 
available at http://policy.ssa.gov/poms.nsfllnxl0200602001 ("The payee receives the benefit with 
the full right and duty to spend it, in the best interests of the beneficiary, according to hislher best 
judgment."). 
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made for fixed rules in some matters involving children, such as the use 
of mandatory guidelines in determining the amount of a child support 
order,191 it cannot be argued that children's interests are advanced by a 
fixed rule requiring state agency representative payees to use foster 
children's Social Security benefits to reimburse state costs without any 
consideration ofthe children's individual needs. 
Further, such fixed rules are in conflict with the Social Security 
Act and implementing regulations that establish the fiduciary duties of 
representative payees to exercise independent and individualized 
jUdgment. l92 Although the Supreme Court did not reach this issue in 
Keffeler,193 some lower courts have addressed the question and have 
concluded that the discretion of representative payees cannot be 
hampered or controlled by state policies. 194 
Thus, while the Supreme Court in Keffeler concluded that state 
agency payees may decide to use foster children's Social Security 
benefits to reimburse state costs, the obligation to exercise independent 
and individualized discretion remains. The agencies must make 
decisions that take into account the individual circumstances of each 
foster child. The substitution of such considered judgment with fixed 
agency rules is in violation of the Social Security Act and should be 
challenged. 
191 See Jane C. Murphy, Eroding the Myth of Discretionary Justice in Family Law: The Child 
Support Experiment, 70 N.C. L. REv. 209 (1991). 
192 See supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
193 The Court did place significance on the state policy in Washington that provides the 
agency with discretion to occasionally depart from the normal practice to use the Social Security 
benefits for special needs. Wash. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of 
Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 378-79 (2003). However, amici point out that the discretion is rarely 
utilized, with the agency only using 3% of the children's benefits for the children's needs rather 
than reimbursing state costs in a random sampling of forty-eight cases. Brief for Juvenile Law 
Center & the National Center on Youth Law as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra 
note 22, at 16. 
194 Ecolono v. Div. of Reimbursements of the Dep't of Health and Mental Hygiene, 137 Md. 
App. 639 (2001). After being to committed to a state mental health facility, Mr. Ecolono 
successfully challenged the automatic use of his Social Security benefits to pay for the cost of 
care. The Court concluded the state agency representative payee failed to exercise required 
discretion by not considering whether the benefits should be used for his post-release living 
expenses rather than reimbursing state costs. Id. Also, in Snider v. Creasy, 728 F.2d 369 (6th 
Cir. 1984), Riddick v. D'Elia, 626 F.2d 1084 (2d Cir. 1980), and Barnes v. Reagen, 501 F. Supp. 
215 (N.D. Iowa 1980), the courts all concluded that OASDI benefits paid to mothers with 
representative payees cannot be deemed income to AFDC applicants, because such state policies 
conflict with the federal requirements that representative payees must exercise discretion in 
determining how to the benefits should best be used for the beneficiaries, and are therefore 
invalid under the Supremacy Clause. 
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B. SSA Duty to Investigate: The "Kiddie Loop" and the Automatic 
Process of Selecting Agencies as Representative Payees 
The selection of a representative payee is a crucial decision. The 
person or agency chosen will be in a position of trust and responsible 
for managing what are often the only resources for a disabled 
individual. For a foster child, the importance of the selection is 
heightened. The selection of the state foster care agency, now armed 
with the Keffeler decision, all but ensures the child will never see a 
dollar of her Social Security benefits. If a representative payee other 
than the agency is chosen, the child may benefit from the payments 
because the state cannot force another payee to reimburse state costs 
and the child may bring a misuse complaint against the payee if the 
benefits are not properly used or conserved. 195 
Recognizing the importance of the decision, the Social Security 
Administration explains that "extreme care" must be exercised in the 
selection of representative payees. 196 A detailed listing of preferred 
categories of representative payees for children are set out in 
regulations, with parents at the top of the list, followed by relatives and 
close friends.197 The least preferred are government agencies or other 
institutional representative payees. 198 When presented with a state 
agency as a potential representative payee, the Social Security 
Administration Commissioner "must also attempt to identify any other 
potential representative payee whose appointment may be preferred."199 
Thus, the duty of the Administration to investigate and choose the 
most suitable representative payee is clear, including the duty to search 
for any payee more preferred than a state agency. Unfortunately, it is 
equally clear that the duty is being ignored. Rather than conducting 
thorough investigations and making individualized decisions to select 
the most preferred payees, an automatic process is used.20o Faced with 
195 KefJeler, 537 U.S. at 389. 
196 POMS, supra note 14, § GN 00501.005(C), available at http://policy.ssa.gov/ 
poms.nsf/1nx/0200501005 (last visited Feb. 16,2006). 
197 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.2021(c), 416.621(c) (2005). 
1981d 
199 KefJeler, 537 U.S. at 376 n.l; see Skoler & Allbright, supra note 102, at 170-71. 
200 See Boyer & Mathews, supra note 25, at 2 (explaining that the process of selecting the 
state agency as representative payee for foster children is practically automatic in many 
jurisdictions); ABA COMM. ON LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE ELDERLY AND CENTER ON CHILDREN 
AND THE LAW, ENHANCING COORDINATION OF STATE COURTS WITH THE FEDERAL 
REPRESENTATIVE PAYMENT PROGRAM: MODEL TRAINING CURRICULUM FOR JUDGES AND 
STAFFS OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURTS, REPRESENTATIVE PAYMENT AND KIDS, 30 (2001) 
(noting concern that SSA field offices appoint agencies as representative payees without 
investigating other possible payee candidates); IOWA DEPT. OF HUMAN RESOURCES, FOSTER 
CARE RECOVERY UNIT, WHAT IF My CHILD RECEIVES SOCIAL SECURITY PAYMENTS OR OTHER 
GOVERNMENT MONEY?, http://www.dhs.state.ia.us/fostercarerecovery (last visited Feb. 17,2006) 
(providing a statement to parents with children in foster care that discourages the parents or others 
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tens of thousands of applications from state agencies to become 
representative payees,2°1 the Social Security Administration developed a 
shortcut in its computer system, called the "kiddie loop," to process 
applications in batches when a single applicant files to be the 
representative payee for multiple beneficiaries.202 With the "kiddie 
loop" in place, rather than conducting investigations to identify the most 
preferred payees for foster children, the Social Security Administration 
simply reviews information provided in applications from the state 
agencies and looks no further.203 
The practice is evident in the conduct of MAXIMUS through its 
revenue maximization contract in Illinois.204 To assist the state agency 
in applying to be representative payee for foster children, court 
pleadings indicate that MAXIMUS created a pre-printed form 
application in which the following statement has been submitted to the 
Social Security Administration without any individualized inquiry: 
Our agency is better qualified to act as payee than the 
parents/relatives of the child because the representative of the 
Department who supervises the child is the person most aware of the 
child's or children's current needs and most qualified to see that the 
benefits are used properly.205 
With the assistance of MAXIMUS, the Illinois agency submitted 
3588 requests to be appointed represented payee for foster children 
from 1994 to 1996, and not a single one of those applications was 
denied in favor of some other payee despite the agency's least-preferred 
status and the duty of the Social Security Administration to try to locate 
any other more preferred payee.206 As of June 1, 1999, the agency was 
acting as payee for 2401 of the 2670 disabled children in foster care, 
from applying to become representative payee: "If your child receives government benefits or you 
receive a benefit check for your child as a representative payee, you should notify the social 
worker or juvenile court officer. The state will be the representative payee while your child is in 
foster care."). 
201 See supra note 1. 
202 POMS, supra note 14, § GN 00502.110(3), available at http://policy.ssa.gov/ 
poms.nsffinxl02005021I O. 
203 The OIG has explained that rather than conducting the required investigation into locating 
the most preferred representative payee, "[t]he basis for selecting a representative payee is the 
information supplied by a prospective payee on the application form." Soc. SEC. ADMIN., OFFICE 
OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, MONITORING REPRESENTATIVE PAYEE PERFORMANCE: ROLL-UP 
REpORT, AUDIT REpORT A-09-96-64201, at 11, 18 (Mar. 1997), available at http://www.ssa.gov/ 
oig/ADOBEPDF/audit_htms/96-64201.htm; see also Boyer & Matthews, supra note 25, at 2 
(noting that SSA generally only relies on information in the application form from the state 
agencies, in which the agencies generally indicate that no other payee is available or suitable to 
protect the child's interests). 
204 See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text. 
205 Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Surnmary Judgment, Willingham v. 
McDonald, No. 96 CO 00120, at 7 (Circuit Ct. Cook County, III.) (July, 1999). 
206 ld. at 8. 
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and representative payee applications from the state agency were 
pending for each of the remaining 269 children.207 
Rather than acknowledging or addressing this automatic selection 
process, the Supreme Court in Keffeler simply pointed to the regulatory 
scheme as evidence that the state agencies are only chosen as the payees 
when no one else is available.208 The real practice must be brought to 
light.209 
C. Equal Protection 
The Supreme Court in Keffeler also did not address the question of 
whether it is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause to require foster 
children who receive Social Security benefits to reimburse state costs 
while other foster children are not required to pay for their own care. 
Although the question was addressed by the Supreme Court of 
Washington when the Keffeler case was remanded, the claim was 
hastily rejected with minimal discussion.210 More consideration is 
warranted. 
1. Are Foster Children Treated Equally? 
In rejecting an equal protection challenge in Keffeler on remand, 
the Supreme Court of Washington essentially reasoned that because all 
representative payees must use the benefits according to state and 
federal laws and regulations, and because the State representative payee 
207 ld. Similar statistics in the Keffeler Joint Appendix also provide evidence of this automatic 
process. In 1999 there were 1480 children receiving foster care benefits in Washington State and 
the state agency, DSHS, was appointed as representative payee for 1411 of those children. Thus, 
a process occurred where DSHS became the representative payee for over 95% of the foster 
children in its care. Joint Appendix, supra note 77, at 136a, 192a. 
208 Wash. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 
371,390-91 (2003). 
209 After Keffeler, a successful legal challenge to this automatic process by bringing a claim 
against the Social Security Administration may be difficult. Under the Social Security Act, the 
Administration is only obligated to reimburse the beneficiary if it is negligent in its selection of a 
representative payee and the negligence results in misuse of the benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 
1383(a)(2)(E) (2000). The Keffeler decision will make proving misuse difficult because the 
Court found the reimbursement practice by state agency payees appropriate under federal 
regulations and rejected the view that the practice is antithetical to the child's best interests. 
Keffeler, 537 U.S. at 375, 389-90. In at least one jurisdiction, advocates have challenged the 
automatic selection process by bringing claims against the state agency rather than against the 
Social Security Administration. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment, supra note 205, at 3-20. 
210 Guardianship Estate of Keffeler v. Wash. State Dep't of Soc. and Health Servs., 151 Wash. 
2d 331 (2004). 
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uses Social Security benefits in accordance with those laws and 
regulations, the State is not violating the Equal Protection Clause.211 
Although not directly stated in the opinion, the court apparently 
concludes that the foster children are being treated equally because it 
does not reach what would be the next questions in an equal protection 
analysis, the questions of what level of scrutiny applies and whether the 
state has a valid reason for differential treatment. 
The decision rejects the claim that the state agency practice creates 
two unequal classes of foster children: those with state agency payees 
whose Social Security benefits are used to reimburse foster care costs, 
and those with private payees whose benefits can be used for special 
needs or be conserved for future use.212 Rather, the decision concludes 
that "there are not two groups of foster children but one group: all foster 
children receiving social security benefits with appointed representative 
payees."213 This characterization misses the point. 
As explained in Judge Sanders' dissent, whether the foster children 
are categorized into one group or two, unequal treatment is still present: 
"Even if we were examining 'one group,' ... children within the group 
are treated unequally for no more reason than one has a private and the 
other a public payee."214 Foster children with state agency 
representative payees are subject to blanket state rules that require the 
children's Social Security benefits to be applied to state costs. Foster 
children who receive Social Security benefits but have any payee other 
than the state agency are not required to apply their benefits to state 
costs. Moreover, another classification not considered by the majority 
or dissenting opinions is possible: expanding either the single class or 
multiple classes of foster children to include a comparison to the 
treatment of those foster children who do not receive Social Security 
benefits. Foster children receiving Social Security benefits are required 
to use the resources to reimburse state costs whereas foster children 
without Social Security benefits are not obligated to repay the cost of 
care. Under any of these categorizations, the children are not treated 
equally.215 The real question is whether the differential treatment is 
justified under equal protection scrutiny. 
211 Id. at 340-41. 
212 Id. 
213 Id. 
214 Id. at 350. 
215 For discussion of classifications in equal protection analysis, see Daniel J. Nusbaum, The 
Craziest Reform of Them All: A Critical Analysis of The Constitutional Implications of 
"Abolishing" the Insanity Defense, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 1509, 1542-52 (2002); Joseph Tussman 
& Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REv. 341,344-53 (1949). 
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2. Minimum Scrutiny 
Even if the practice does not warrant heightened scrutiny,216 the 
question remains whether there is a rational reason based upon a 
legitimate government interest217 for state foster care agencies to take 
Social Security benefits from foster children, when other foster children 
have no obligation to pay for their care. The interest of states in the 
practice is clear-saving state money for other purposes. However, 
while a state's interest in saving money and preserving the fiscal 
integrity of its programs may be legitimate, the Supreme Court has 
explained that such a purpose "provides no justification for its decision 
to discriminate among equally eligible citizens,"218 and cannot be 
accomplished through "invidious distinctions between classes of its 
citizens."219 
In Gean v. Hattaway, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
addressed this specific question of whether a state agency's use of foster 
children's Social Security benefits violates the Equal Protection 
Clause.22o Comparing the practice to a progressive income tax scheme 
where citizens with higher incomes must contribute a higher percentage 
of their earnings to the state finances, the court answered the question in 
the negative.221 The reasoning turns the notion of progressive taxation 
216 An argument exists that foster children should be considered a "quasi-suspect" class for 
purposes of equal protection scrutiny. See Nancy M. v. Scanlon, 666 F. Supp. 723, 727-28 
(1987) (concluding that foster children are a "sensitive class" requiring intermediate scrutiny). 
For an analysis of the argument that all children as a class should be considered a suspect or 
quasi-suspect class, see Deana A. Pollard, Banning Corporal Punishment: A Constitutional 
AnalYSiS, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 447, 475-82 (2002); see also Brad Colwell & Brian D. Schwartz, 
Homeless and Alien Students: A Duty to Educate, 165 ED. LAW REP. 447, 452-57 (2002) 
(providing a summary of the Supreme Court's decisions regarding whether heightened scrutiny to 
should be applied to various classifications of children). However, the status of being a foster 
child is not the relevant factor leading to unequal treatment in the practice of state agencies taking 
foster children's Social Security benefits. The differential treatment does not hinge on the status 
of being a foster child, but rather on whether the foster child receives Social Security benefits and 
has a state agency representative payee. 
217 If state legislation or other official action results in unequal treatment, it is presumed the 
legislation or action is valid as long as the classification and differential treatment is "rationally 
related to a legitimate state interest." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 
(l985). 
218 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 507 {I 999). 
219 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375 (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 
633 (l969)). 
220 330 F.3d 758 (6th Cir. 2003). 
221 Id. at 771-72. In refusing to recognize "a prohibition writ large against making distinctions 
among 'equally eligible citizens' for the purpose of conserving state resources," the Sixth Circuit 
explained: 
[Sltates with a progressive income tax scheme generally require a citizen, as her 
income increases, to contribute a higher percentage of her earnings to the state fisc. 
Such a tax system distinguishes among citizens, all of whom are-in theory-equally 
eligible to support the state government, in order to improve the state's finances. Also, 
2006] PAYING FOR FOSTER CARE 1835 
on its head. Rather than considering a means to increase revenue for 
under-funded foster care programs by spreading the cost across society 
in a reasoned and progressive fashion, states tum to the very children in 
need of assistance because they have the least ability to complain. 
Requiring children who have been abused and neglected to pay the bill 
for their resulting foster care does not fit within the "basic concept of 
our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to 
individual responsibility or wrongdoing."222 
Further, even if the Gean v. Hattaway decision were correct-that 
a foster child's ability to pay is a valid basis for differential treatment-
the court ignores the irrational distinction that some children with 
resources are required to reimburse state foster care costs (those with 
state agency representative payees) whereas other children with 
resources are not (those with assets or income other than Social Security 
and those who receive Social Security benefits but have anyone other 
than the state agency as representative payee). The Supreme Court has 
determined that the differential treatment of prisoners from individuals 
criminally convicted but not incarcerated regarding the responsibility to 
reimburse state costs, without a rational basis, is unconstitutional.223 
Children who are abused and neglected, removed from their homes and 
placed in foster care, and are disabled or have deceased or disabled 
parents dt-serve at least the same constitutional protections. 
Id. 
in managing social welfare programs, the state makes distinctions among its citizens 
based upon a sort of "ability to pay." Though a state cannot discriminate against a 
potential welfare recipient based upon how long that individual has been in the state, it 
can-and does-discriminate against that individual based upon his ability to provide 
for himself without state assistance. 
222 Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972); see also Reed v. 
Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 854 n.5 (1986) (quoting Weber); Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. I, 7 (1983) 
(same); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982) (same). 
223 Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966). In Rinaldi, the Court considered a New Jersey 
statute that attempted to reduce expenditures by requiring prisoners who took an unsuccessful 
appeal to reimburse the State for the cost of furnishing a trial transcript, but the statute did not 
require similar repayments from unsuccessful appellants who were not incarcerated but were 
given a suspended sentence, placed on probation, or sentenced only to a fine. Id. at 307-08. The 
Court determined the statute was unconstitutional because there was no rational basis for the 
distinction between unsuccessful appellants who were in prison and those who were not. /d. at 
308-09. A comparison can also be made to the differential treatment of children classified as 
illegitimate, addressed by the Supreme Court's 1974 decision in Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 
628 (1974). In Jimenez, the Supreme Court held that a statute denying Social Security benefits to 
some illegitimate children does not withstand minimal scrutiny, despite recognizing the 
government's legitimate interest in preventing spurious claims for benefits. 417 U.S. at 636. The 
Court explained that even if children might be rationally classified based upon their illegitimate 
status, their birth after the onset of the parent's disability, and other indicia of dependency upon 
the disabled parent, the creation of two subclasses of illegitimate children was both overinclusive 
and underinclusive: "[T]he two subclasses of illegitimates stand on equal footing, and the 
potential for spurious claims is the same as to both; hence to conclusively deny one subclass 
benefits presumptively available to the other denies the former the equal protection of the 
laws .... " Id. at 637. 
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D. Due Process: Insufficient Notice 
A child is a person under the Constitution.224 Social Security 
benefits are statutory entitlements warranting Constitutional due process 
protection.225 Accordingly, foster children must be provided with due 
process protections before actions are taken that may affect their Social 
Security benefits, including the selection of a representative payee.226 If 
provided with proper due process protections, including advance notice 
and the opportunity to object, the response of a foster child or the 
child's attorney to the application of a state agency to become the 
child's representative payee would seem obvious. As Judge Sanders of 
the Supreme Court of Washington explained in his dissenting opinion in 
Keffeler on remand: 
If a foster child were entitled to Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 
benefits or Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) 
benefits, or both, who would he rather have as his representative 
payee, the State or grandma? I posit the answer to the question does 
not require a degree in rocket science but is well within the 
comprehension of the average well-informed six-year-old.227 
If Judge Sanders is correct in his description of a child's viewpoint, 
why are foster children and their lawyers not objecting to the automatic 
selection state agencies as representative payees? A closer examination 
of the Social Security Administration's advance notice requirements 
provides an answer. 
While the Social Security Act and implementing regulations 
require advance notice in the selection of a representative payee, it is 
unclear to whom the notice must be provided. The Act explains that in 
the case of a minor the advance notice "shall be provided solely to the 
legal guardian or legal representative of such individual."228 Already, 
the statutory requirement is constitutionally troublesome. Service upon 
the child's legal representative is only listed as an option,229 and service 
224 In re Gault, 387 U.S. I (1967). 
225 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 322-23 (1976). 
226 Advance notice and the opportunity to object to the selection of a representative payee is 
required. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.2030, 416.630 (2005). 
227 Guardianship Estate of Keffeler v. Wash. State Dep't of Soc. and Health Servs., lSI Wash. 
2d 331, 346 (2004). 
228 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(j)(2)(E)(ii), I 383(a)(2)(8)(xii) (2000). 
229 The Supreme Court's opinion in In re Gault recognized that the Due Process Clause does 
not merely provide for the child (or the child's attorney) to be an optional person for receiving 
notice, but demands that the child is a required recipient: 
We conclude that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that 
in respect of proceedings to determine delinquency which may result in commitment to 
an institution in which the juvenile's freedom is curtailed, the child and his parents 
must be notified of the child's right to be represented by counsel retained by them, or if 
they are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will be appointed to represent the child. 
In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 41(emphasis added). 
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upon the legal guardian may not be sufficient to protect the child's 
interest because the legal guardian and the person or institution seeking 
to become representative payee may be the same.230 The POMS, the 
operations manual used by Social Security staff, adds to the concern. 
Regarding the procedure for sending the advance notice about the 
selection of a representative payee, the POMS explains that "[i]f the 
beneficiary is a child, under age eighteen and not legally emancipated, 
the need for an advance notice depends on many factors."231 Multiple 
options for possible notice are then listed, including a "legal guardian or 
authorized representative," the parent in some circumstances, or a 
"person standing in [the] place of a parent."232 The POMS does not list 
the child or the child's attorney as a required recipient of the advance 
notice, and the language implies that there may be instances in which no 
notice is required.233 
With this lack of clear guidance regarding notice requirements, it is 
not surprising that foster children and their attorneys do not receive the 
advance notice234 and therefore do not object to the selection of state 
agencies as representative payees. The current notice practices are 
deficient and vulnerable to legal challenge.235 
230 The Social Security Administration's Philadelphia Region explains that a state foster care 
agency may be the recipient of the advance notification of a representative payee selection when 
the state agency is the legal guardian of the child. Email from Bob Murphy, Deputy Assistant 
Regional Commissioner, Social Security Administration Philadelphia Region, to author, Info 
about Rep Payees (Nov. 24,2004) (on file with author). 
231 POMS, supra note 14, § GN 00503.100(E)(2), available at http://policy.ssa.gov/ 
poms.nsfllnxl0200503100!opendocument (last visited Feb. 17,2006). 
232 Id. 
233 Id. Another POMS section provides additional guidance, explaining that "[w]hen you 
select a payee for a child in foster care, exercise caution and ensure that you follow proper 
procedures and give due process," but regarding notice, the guidance only explains the need to 
give advance notice to the parents. Notices to the child, to child's counselor even to a legal 
guardian are not mentioned. Id. § GN 00502.159, available at http://policy.ssa.gov/poms.nsfl 
lnxl0200502159!opendocument (last visited Feb. 17,2005). It is also important to note that the 
form SSA uses for processing applications for potential representative payees does not provide a 
means to collect information about a foster child's attorney, so it is highly unlikely the 
Administration would ever be made aware that an attorney has been appointed to represent the 
child. Id. § GN 00502.115, Form SA-11-BK, available at http://policy.ssa.gov/ 
poms.nsfllnxl0200502115!opendocument (last visited Feb. 17, 2005). Further, related to the 
concern with the notice requirement, the POMS provides an explanation of appeals rights 
regarding the selection of a representative payee, and provides a list of who may appeal. A non-
emancipated child and child's counsel are not listed. Thus, even if the foster children and their 
attorneys were receiving proper notice, it is not clear if the Social Security Administration would 
allow their appeals to be processed. Id. § GN 00503.110, available at http://policy.ssa.gov/ 
poms.nsfllnxl0200502110!opendocument (last visited Feb. 17,2005). 
234 Telephone Interview with Joan Little, Chief Attorney, Baltimore City Child Advocacy 
Unit, Legal Aid Bureau, Inc. (July 18, 2005) (confirming that Maryland Legal Aid attorneys 
representing children in foster care do not receive notice regarding representative payee 
applications). 
235 In addition to the concern that foster children are not receiving the advance notice, there is 
also an argument that the content of the notice is insufficient because it does not inform 
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E. Takings Clause 
State agencies obtain access to foster children's Social Security 
benefits by becoming representative payees and then using the 
children's benefit payments to reimburse the state coffers for foster care 
costs that the children have no legal obligation to reimburse. The 
children receive no financial benefit or additional services from the 
practice. This public use of foster children's Social Security benefits 
implicates the spirit of the Takings Clause protections, that "private 
property" shall not "be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. "236 
To fall within the takings analysis, a "private property" interest 
must be at stake, and the Supreme Court in Flemming v. Nestor refused 
to "engraft upon the Social Security system a concept of 'accrued 
property rights '" because Congress specifically reserved for itself "'the 
right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision' of the ACt."237 If the 
reasoning in Flemming applies to use of foster children's Social 
Security benefits by state agencies, the takings analysis is at an end.238 
However, such practice does not involve an attempt by Congress to 
modify rights to Social Security benefits but rather state action to take 
the benefits after they have already been paid by the federal 
government. Rather than the type of congressional alteration to Social 
Security benefits that was ruled outside of the takings analysis in 
Flemming, the practice of state foster care agencies taking foster 
children's Social Security benefits falls within the hypothetical 
proposed by Jed Rubenfeld: 
And suppose a state seized the checks the federal government had 
sent to A, or passed a law directing the relevant banks to forward all 
such money to a state account. Putting aside any other issues raised 
by such state action, surely it will be conceded that the state has 
deprived A of property in every constitutional sense of that term.239 
If Flemming does not act as an obstacle, the Supreme Court's Penn 
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City decision provides three 
factors to be applied in a regulatory takings analysis: "the economic 
impact of the regulation on the claimant, ... the extent to which the 
individuals that state agency representative payees may use the Social Security benefits to 
reimburse state costs but that any other representative payee cannot be forced to do so. A similar 
argument was rejected by the Seventh Circuit. See Mason v. Sybinski, 280 F.3d 788, 794 (7th 
Cir.2002). 
236 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
237 Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 610-11 (1960) (citing Elmer F. Wollenberg, Vested 
Rights in Social-Security Benefits, 37 OR. L. REv. 299, 359 (1958); 42 U.S.C. § 1304). 
238 For a discussion of the importance and concerns with the Flemming decision, see Charles 
A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 768-69 (1964). 
239 Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALEL.J. 1077, 1109 (1993). 
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regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed 
expectations, ... [and] the character of the governmental action."240 
In 1987, the Supreme Court applied the Penn Central factors in 
Bowen v. Gilliard, concluding no regulatory taking occurs when a 
family is required to assign children's child support rights to the state in 
order for a family to be eligible for welfare benefits.241 Bowen provides 
a comparable analysis in considering whether a regulatory taking occurs 
when a state agency follows state statutes, regulations, or policies 
directing it to use foster children's Social Security benefits to reimburse 
state costs. The Court in Bowen addressed the first Penn Central factor, 
"[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the c1aimant,"242 and found 
little economic impact on the child from the trade-off of assigning his 
child support rights in order to receive welfare payments,243 or what has 
been described as a "rough exchange."244 Contrary to what was 
described as an equal exchange in Bowen, when a state foster care 
agency becomes representative payee and takes children's Social 
Security benefits to reimburse the state, the children gain nothing while 
losing the opportunity to use their benefits to purchase items necessary 
for personal and special needs, to provide extra health care, therapeutic 
and educational services not normally provided by the state foster care 
program, and to conserve unused funds for future needs. Whereas the 
children required to assign their child support rights in Bowen received 
the benefit of increased welfare payments and $50 per month of passed 
through child support,245 foster children receive no financial benefit 
240 Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
241 Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 606-08 (1987). 
242 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124. 
243 The Court in Bowen concluded that the economic impact of the requirement to assign the 
child's child support rights to the state was mitigated by three benefits the child received: I) the 
$50 of child support "passed through" back to family, 2) the increase in AFDC benefits resulting 
from the inclusion of the additional child in the assistance unit, and 3) that the State used its own 
enforcement power to collect the support payments, and therefore bore the risk of nonpayment of 
the child support. Bowen, 483 U.S. at 606-07. 
244 Williams v. Humphreys, 125 F. Supp. 2d 881, 888 (2000). In Humphreys, the Court 
addressed the practice in Indiana of requiring assignment of child support rights for children who 
do not receive any welfare benefits because of the state's family benefit cap, and concluded the 
practice violates the takings clause because there was no "rough exchange" as in Bowen. Id at 
888,891. 
245 The $50 pass through requirement previously required under federal law was eliminated in 
1996. Barbara Glesner Fines, From Representing "Clients" to Serving "Recipients": 
Transforming the Role of the IV-D Child Support Enforcement Attorney, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 
2155, 2158 n.15 (1999) (explaining that the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996 eliminated the "pass through" requirement). Without this federal 
requirement, new constitutional challenges could be brought under the Bowen analysis against 
states that do not voluntarily pass through any assigned child support back to the families. For a 
survey of state policies regarding the pass through of assigned child support since the elimination 
of the federal requirement, see PAULA ROBERTS & MICHELLE VINSON, STATE POLICY 
REGARDING PAss-THROUGH AND DISREGARD OF CURRENT MONTH'S CHILD SUPPORT 
COLLECTED FOR FAMILIES RECEIVING TANF-FUNDED CASH ASSISTANCE (2004), 
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from giving up their Social Security benefits. The only benefit the 
children arguably receive is the increased likelihood that the state 
agency will help those foster children who are not already eligible apply 
to receive Social Security benefits.246 This is not a "rough exchange."247 
Addressing the second Penn Central factor, "the extent to which 
the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed 
expectations,"248 the Court in Bowen explained that a child receiving 
child support payments in North Carolina "holds no vested protectable 
expectation that his or her parent will continue to receive identical 
support payments on the child's behalf," and the prospective right to 
support payments "are clearly subject to modification by law, be it 
through judicial decree, state legislation, or congressional 
enactment."249 The Flemming decision concluded that because 
Congress reserved the right for itself to modify, restrict, or terminate the 
benefits, a congressional restriction on Social Security benefits is not a 
taking.250 However, Social Security benefits are entitlements 
warranting constitutional due process protections,25I and although 
Congress is free to modify or terminate the benefits, states are not. 
Although foster children may not have a "vested protectable 
expectation" that their Social Security benefits will not be altered by 
Congress, the children do have a protectable expectation that their 
benefits will not be altered, terminated, or taken by the actions of a state 
government. 
The Supreme Court in Bowen analyzed the third Penn Central 
factor, "the character of the governmental action,"252 and noted the 
"hard choices" the government must make in deciding how to allocate 
benefits in a welfare program.253 The Court concluded that the decision 
to include child support as part of family income and require assignment 
of the rights to child support as a condition of eligibility for welfare 
benefits is not "an enactment that forces 'some people alone to bear 
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the 
public as a whole. "'254 Significance was placed on the notion of choice, 
with the Court explaining that the "law does not require any custodial 
http://www .clasp.org/publications/pass _ thru3. pdf. 
246 See supra notes 120-121 and accompanying text. 
247 Another important distinction from Bowen is that federal law requires that states have 
children assign their child support rights in order to receive welfare assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 
608(a)(3) (2000). There is no federal requirement that states take foster children's Social Security 
benefits in exchange of the children's care. 
248 Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
249 Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 607 (1987). 
250 Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 610-11 (1960). 
251 Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 322-23 (1976). 
252 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124. 
253 Bowen, 483 U.S. at 608. 
254 ld (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960». 
2006] PA YING FOR FOSTER CARE 1841 
parent to apply for AFDC benefits," and that a parent deciding to apply 
for welfare benefits does so because she must have decided that the 
family as a whole will be better off by receiving the welfare benefits.255 
Thus, the Court reasoned, the family is receiving "just compensation" 
for making the choice to apply for benefits and assign the child support 
rights in exchange.256 
For a child in foster care, there is no choice. The child does not 
choose to be abused and neglected. The child does not choose to be 
taken from her home, she does not choose to give up her Social Security 
benefits, and she does not receive "just compensation" when forced to 
do so. If the test is whether foster children do not have a choice and 
whether the practice of state agencies taking the children's Social 
Security benefits forces foster children "to bear public burdens which, 
in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole,"257 
that test is met. 
F. Double Dipping and Improper Reimbursement Practices 
In addition to the several legal questions discussed above, 
additional concerns exist regarding state agency accounting and 
reimbursement practices. For example, states may be double dipping by 
paying themselves back more than once for the same foster care costs, 
and some states may be ignoring the federal requirement to establish 
dedicated accounts for children's lump-sum benefit awards that can 
only be used for special needs. 
Under current practices, states seek to recoup foster care costs from 
at least three sources: the parents, the children, and the federal 
government. Parents are required to reimburse the state for foster care 
costs by establishing child support obligations that are then paid to the 
state rather than to the children.258 Children reimburse state costs 
through the practice of state agencies taking their Social Security 
benefits. The federal government partially reimburses state foster care 
costs through the IV -E program.259 
Due to lax accounting practices,26o the possibility exists for states 
to double dip by reimbursing themselves from more than one of these 
sources. For example, the Office of Inspector General has noted 
multiple instances where foster care agencies have improperly claimed 
255 ld. at 608-09. 
256 ld. at 609. 
257 Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49. 
258 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
259 See supra notes 146-147 and accompanying text. 
260 See supra Part ILF. 
1842 CARDOZO LA W REVIEW [Vol. 27:4 
IV-E reimbursement for children who are simultaneously receiving SSI, 
which is also being used to reimburse state costS.261 Also, a failure to 
coordinate cross-agency accounting systems could allow states to 
receive duplicate reimbursement from children's SSI benefits and from 
child support payments for the same foster care costs. This would likely 
occur if a state agency uses a child's Social Security benefits to 
reimburse itself for a specific month and then makes no re-designation 
of the child support obligation for that same month. If the child support 
stays on the books as owed to the state rather than being re-designated 
as owed to the child after the child's SSI is taken, double payment is 
possible.262 
In addition to the concern with possible double dipping, some 
states may be taking foster children's Social Security benefits that 
should be placed in protected dedicated accounts. In 1996, Congress 
required that retroactive lump-sum payments of SSI benefits exceeding 
six times the monthly benefit amount must be deposited into dedicated 
interest-bearing bank accounts which can only be used for certain 
special needs of the beneficiaries.263 Contrary to the normal rule 
regarding Social Security benefits, there is an explicit prohibition 
against using benefits in dedicated accounts for current maintenance. 
Thus, if a child receives a retroactive SSI award that must be placed in a 
dedicated account, such benefits should be off-limits from the state 
practice of using benefits to reimburse state costs as current 
maintenance. 
However, some states have been side-stepping this rule. For 
example, Maryland has apparently used the same "Interim Assistance 
Reimbursement" program264 to take foster children's lump sum SSI 
awards that is normally used to seek reimbursement from adults who 
receive interim state cash assistance until their SSI applications are 
successfuP65 The legality of the practice is suspect. 
261 See, e.g., BALTIMORE CITY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES AUDIT REpORT, supra 
note 157, at 6-7; SAN FRANCISCO DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES AUDIT REpORT, supra note 
165, at 4-5. 
262 In Keffeler, the state agency admitted that in some cases the agency might be using child 
support and Social Security benefits to pay for the same foster care expenses. Reply Brief for 
Petitioners at 19, Wash. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 
537 U.S. 371 (2003) (No. 01-1420), 2002 WL 31527638. 
263 42 U.S.C. § 1383(a)(2)(F) (2000). 
264 20 C.F.R. § 416.1901 (2005); 42 U.S.c. § 1383(g) (2000); POMS, supra note 14, § SI 
02003.001, available at http://policy.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0502003001. 
265 See Wicomico County Dep't of Soc. Servs., Memorandum from Pat Davis, Finance, to 
Shelley Vitell, IV-E Specialist (Apr. 23, 2003) ("I have enclosed the most current policy for SSI 
lump sum distribution. Since we are using the 340 form (Interim Payment Reimbursement 
Authorization) there will be very few cases where we will need a Dedicated Account set up.") (on 
file with author); Washington County Dep't of Soc. Servs., Memorandum from Rosalind Martin 
to Bob McEnroe, DEAP Meeting of January 19, 2000 Regarding Dedicated Accounts for SS1 
Children in Foster Care (Jan. 19,2000) ("Policy now requires that when any local department of 
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The Social Security Administration can only reimburse states out 
of an individual's retroactive SSI award through the federal "Interim 
Assistance Reimbursement" program. 266 States can seek this 
reimbursement when they provide "interim assistance" to an individual 
during the pendency of the individual's SSI eligibility determination 
process.267 "Interim assistance" or "IA" is vaguely defined and 
intended to include what several states have termed "general assistance" 
or minimal cash assistance to disabled adults.268 It is questionable 
whether state foster care assistance provided to children can be 
considered "interim assistance."269 If it can, states still cannot seek 
reimbursement from retroactive SSI awards unless they first obtain 
written consent to reimbursement from the individuals who received the 
interim assistance, in this case the foster children.27o 
The California Department of Social Services initially overcame 
this challenge of obtaining consents from foster children by simply 
signing the consent reimbursement agreements on the children's behalf. 
The agency then indicated it was ceasing the practice in 1999, 
explaining that the change in policy was "the result of SSA's 
determination that there exists a potential conflict of interest" between 
the financial interests of foster children and the state agency "when the 
agency's representative is permitted to sign the IAR agreement on 
behalf of both parties."271 It is unclear how many other state agencies 
may be using the same questionable practice. 
social services applies for SSI benefits for a child that is placed in Foster Care an Interim 
Payment Reimbursement Authorization Form (DHRlFIA 340) must be completed in order for the 
State to be able to reimburse for lump sum payments that are posted to back cost of care. 
Because of this procedure, the number of Dedicated Accounts that we will process will be very 
few.") (on file with author). 
266 See supra note 264. 
267 POMS, supra note 14, § SI 02003.001, available at http://policy.ssa.gov/ 
poms.nsfllnxl050200300 1 (last visited Feb. 17, 2006). 
268 Id. ("Terms like general relief, general assistance, welfare payments, etc .... are often used 
interchangeably with IA or Interim Assistance Reimbursement (IAR)."). 
269 The POMS explains that such interim assistance (IA) "must be in the form of cash or 
vendor payments for meeting basic needs," that the IA "does not include assistance the State 
gives to or for any other person," and that "IA is not payable to the States for assistance payments 
related to programs like Medicaid and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families." Id. 
270 20 C.F.R. § 416.1901 (2005). 
271 Letter from Wesley Beers, Acting Deputy Director, Children and Family Services 
Division, California Department of Social Services, to All County Welfare Directors (Sept. 24, 
1999), available at http://www.dss.cahwnet.gov/getinfo/acl99/99-73.PDF. An unreported 
California opinion noted the practice but did not express any concern despite two Social Security 
Administration audits that determined the county agency failed to obtain the required written 
authorizations from the SSI beneficiaries. In re Michael A., No. A0985l0, 2003 WL 1844089 
(Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2003). 
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM 
In addition to the need for increased litigation efforts to challenge 
the current practices of state foster care agencies, foster children need a 
deliberative policy debate that can lead to reasoned policies replacing 
ad-hoc practices. Below are some possible suggestions for 
consideration.272 
A. Improving Selection of Representative Payees 
While the Social Security Administration's responsibility for 
approximately 7.6 million beneficiaries requiring representative 
payees273 ensures a level of continued bureaucratic failings, significant 
improvements to the system are possible, beginning with the selection 
process. Several steps should be taken to improve the selection process 
so that when a state agency is selected as representative payee, it is truly 
because no other more preferred payee is available. 
First, the current practices of providing advance notice prior to the 
selection of proposed representative payees for foster children are 
inadequate and must be improved.274 Improved notice can increase the 
opportunity for objecting to proposed payees and provide additional 
information to aid the Social Security Administration's investigation 
into other possible choices. 
The content of the advance notice form should be clarified to 
explain the ramifications of the decision, including an explanation that 
if a state agency is selected as payee, then the agency may decide to 
apply the benefits to state costs, but that any other payee cannot be 
required to do so. Once the content is clarified, the vague and 
inconsistent practices regarding service of the notice must be replaced 
with clear requirements. The notice should always be provided to the 
child and to the attorney or guardian ad litem appointed to represent the 
child in judicial proceedings.275 Also, the notice should be sent to both 
272 This is not an exhaustive list of possible reforms, but examples of changes that could be 
considered in improving the current policies and practices surrounding foster children's Social 
Security benefits. 
273 SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, AUDIT REpORT A-02-
03-13032: SUITABILITY OF INDIVIDUALS ACTING AS REPRESENTATIVE PAYEES 1 (2003), 
available at http://www.ssa.gov/oig/ADOBEPDF/A-02-03-13032.pdf. 
274 See supra notes 228-234 and accompanying text. 
275 The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) requires that every foster child 
must have an attorney or guardian ad litem. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(xiii) (2000). In those 
jurisdictions where the child is represented by a guardian ad litem or an attorney that provides 
representation under the "best interests" model, and depending on the age of the child and other 
factors, it may also be necessary to provide notice directly to the child. For discussion of the 
concerns regarding the "best interests" model of providing legal representation to children, see 
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parents, the child's current and past foster care or relative caretakers, to 
other parties in the juvenile proceedings, and to the juvenile court judge. 
As an option to reduce the burden on the Social Security 
Administration, the obligation to provide the advance notice could be 
shifted to individuals or agencies when they apply to become 
representative payees. 
Second, rather than the current application form used by all 
prospective representative payees,276 an application specific to foster 
children should be created. The form should be improved to collect 
additional information about the child's status and to aid the 
investigation for more preferred payees, including additional fields for 
obtaining required information that would facilitate the additional notice 
requirements suggested above. For example, the form should include a 
field in which a state agency applicant must provide contact information 
for the child's attorney or guardian ad litem. State agency applicants 
should also be required to serve a copy of the application form to all 
persons required to receive the advance notice form. 
Third, other options for possible representative payees should be 
explored. Non-profit organizations that already provide representative 
payee services to adults could be encouraged to offer the same services 
to foster children.277 Also, non-profit pooled trusts could be established 
with the dual purpose of providing representative payee services for 
foster children and establishing trust accounts and independence plans 
that conserve children's Social Security benefits in a manner that avoids 
the SSI resource limits and that help the children plan for their transition 
out of foster care.278 
generally David R. Katner, Coming to Praise, Not to Bury, the New ABA Standards of Practice 
for Lawyers Who Represent Children in Abuse and Neglect Proceedings, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 103 (2000); Proceedings of the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation 
of Children, Recommendations of the Conference, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1301 (1996). 
276 SOc. SEC. ADMIN., FORM SSA-lI: REQUEST TO BE SELECTED AS PAYEE, available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/online/ssa-Il.pdf(last visited Feb. 17, 2006). 
277 See supra note 117 and accompanying text. Serious caution should be taken in exploring 
this option, as there have been instances of misuse of beneficiary funds by organizations 
providing representative payee services. See Inviting Fraud: Has the Social Security 
Administration Allowed Some Payees to Deceive the Elderly and Disabled?, before S. Spec. 
Comm. on Aging, 106th Congo (2000) (statement of John Huse, Jr., Inspector General, Social 
Security Administration), available at http://aging.senate.gov/public/eventsIhr50jh.htm 
(describing examples of organizational representative payees misusing beneficiary funds). 
278 See supra notes 140-144 and accompanying text. Several states already have nonprofit 
pooled trusts that allow disabled individuals to conserve resources that are exempt from the SSI 
resource limit. See, e.g., The Florida Pooled Trust, http://www.firstpooledtrust.org/ 
Pooled%20Trust.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2006); The Arc of Texas, Master Pooled Trust, 
http://www.thearcoftexas.orglMaster%20Pooled%20Trustlmpt_home-.page.htm (last visited Nov. 
1, 2005); Pooled Advocate Trust, Inc., http://www.pooledadvocatetrustinc.com (last visited Feb. 
17, 2006) (nonprofit pooled trust serving South Dakota). 
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B. Improving Federal Guidance 
The questions of whether and how a state foster care agency can 
use children's Social Security benefits have never been specifically 
addressed through federal policies. The answers-reached through 
federal legislative or regulatory process that includes the opportunity for 
public comment and criticism-are long overdue. If true to the 
principles of fiduciary obligations and promotion of the best interests of 
foster children, the answers should halt current practices. If not, and 
state agencies are allowed to continue the practice of reimbursing 
themselves with foster children's Social Security benefits, additional 
clarifications will be necessary. 
1. Prohibiting Agency Rules that Restrict Fiduciary Discretion 
Federal guidance should explain that fixed rules requiring state 
agencies to use foster children's benefits to reimburse state costs are in 
violation of the Social Security Act's requirements for representative 
payees to exercise individualized discretion. The guidance should 
explain that a child's benefits should only be used to reimburse state 
costs when it is determined that the child has no other current or future 
needs toward which the benefits could be better applied.279 
2. Providing Strategies to Aid Transition to Independence 
To help address the barriers children face as they age out of foster 
care, states should be provided with suggested strategies and tools to aid 
the transition while also avoiding the $2000 asset limit for SSI. For 
example, a regulatory addition to the Plan for Achieving Self Support 
(P ASS)28o program could be developed that outlines a preferred 
program where foster children's SSI benefits are conserved as part of 
individually developed plans for the children's transition out of care. 
279 Such guidance would then be consistent with current regulations restricting a representative 
payee's ability to use Social Security benefits to pay beneficiary debts. 20 C.F.R. §§ 
404.2040(d), 416.640(d) (2005). 
280 See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
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3. Preventing Double Dipping and Inappropriate 
Reimbursement Practices 
1847 
To address possible "double dipping" and inappropriate 
reimbursement practices, state agencies should be directed that if they 
use a child's Social Security benefits to pay foster care costs for a 
specific month, child support owed by the child's parents to the state for 
the same month must be redirected as an obligation now owed to the 
child.281 Also, agency practices that ignore or bypass the requirement to 
place foster children's retroactive SSI awards In protected dedicated 
accounts should be explicitly prohibited.282 
C. Coordination with Juvenile Courts 
The Social Security Administration has an overwhelming task in 
administering the representative payee system, and could use some help. 
While the nation's juvenile court systems are likely even more 
overburdened,283 the two systems could assist one another through 
improved communications and coordinated actions. For example, the 
additional notice requirements for proposed representative payees, as 
suggested above, would require that the advance notice be sent to all 
parties in the juvenile court proceedings as well as to the judge. This 
additional notice would provide additional opportunities to object and to 
provide information to the Social Security Administration in its 
investigation for the most preferred payee. Also, the notice would serve 
as a trigger for possible additional investigation and questioning in the 
juvenile court proceedings regarding the foster child's resources and 
plans for the child's transition to independence. 
Improved coordination could also be employed as an additional 
281 See supra notes 58, 262 and accompanying text. 
282 See supra notes 263-271 and accompanying text. Of concern, new proposed rules from the 
Social Security Administration could increase the likelihood of inappropriate use of children's 
benefits. One of the proposed changes would provide an exception to the current rule that 
requires representative payees to keep beneficiaries' funds separate from the payees own funds 
and ensure the beneficiaries ownership is indicated on the accounts. Under the new rule, state or 
local government agencies could request exceptions that would allow the agencies to place the 
children's benefits into state accounts. Representative Payment Policies and Administrative 
Procedure for Imposing Penalties for False or Misleading Statements or Withholding of 
Information, 70 Fed. Reg. 60,251 (proposed Oct. 17,2005) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 
408 & 416). 
283 See. e.g., Bruce A. Boyer, Jurisdictional Conflicts Between Juvenile Courts and Child 
Welfare Agencies: The Uneasy Relationship Between Institutional Co-Parents, 54 MD. L. REV. 
377, 377 (1995) ("Juvenile courts, particularly in large urban areas, have been swamped by 
increasing case loads that challenge their ability to provide effective oversight of dependent, 
neglected, and abused children."). 
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means of monitoring whether a state agency payee is properly 
considering the individual needs of foster children before deciding how 
to use the children's Social Security benefits. Foster care agencies are 
required to provide progress reports in court review hearings at least 
every six months.284 If detailed information about the agencies' use of 
children's Social Security benefits were required in such reports, the 
judge, the children and their attorneys, the parents, and other parties in 
the juvenile court case could take a more active role in monitoring the 
agencies' actions. Then, the enhanced progress reports could also be 
filed with the Social Security Administration to provide additional 
information not gathered through the Administration's flawed 
accounting system.285 Also, were the juvenile court orders submitted to 
the Social Security Administration, the additional information could aid 
the Administration in tracking the status of the beneficiaries.286 Such 
information, for example, could assist in reducing the number of cases 
in which state agency payees have continued to receive Social Security 
benefits on behalf of children no longer in state care.287 
D. Realigning the Interaction Between IV-E and SSI 
Currently, IV -E benefits are considered "income based on need" to 
foster children and accordingly result in a dollar-for-dollar reduction in 
children's SSI benefits.288 A realignment of IV-E and SSI would help 
the children as well as the state foster care agencies. If IV-E benefits 
were no longer treated as income to the foster child but simply a federal 
payment to assist state foster care agencies, dually eligible children 
could receive the full amount of SSI benefits while the states received 
their needed reimbursement from the IV-E program. States would then 
no longer be placed in the conflict situation of picking between the two 
benefits based upon the states' fiscal interests rather than the best 
284 Federal law requires review hearings for children in foster care at least every six months. 
42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(B) (2000); 45 C.F.R § 1355.34(c)(2)(ii) (2005). Many states have enacted 
legislation mandating the foster care agencies to provide detailed written progress reports at the 
review hearings. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 8-516(E) (2005); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 620.240 
(2005). 
285 See supra notes 170-175 and accompanying text. 
286 Procedures would need to be implemented in order to preserve confidentiality. 
287 See supra notes 160-161, 169 and accompanying text. For additional analysis and 
suggestions regarding the need for improved coordination between the Social Security 
Administration's representative payee system and the juvenile court system, see ABA COMM. ON 
LEGAL PROBS. OF THE ELDERLY & CENTER ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW, ENHANCING 
COORDINATION OF STATE COURTS WITH THE FEDERAL REPRESENTATIVE PAYMENT PROGRAM: 
FINAL PROJECT REPORT (2001). 
288 See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
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interests of the children.289 Then, if a foster child's eligibility to receive 
SSI acted as a trigger for categorical eligibility for IV -E benefits, the 
simplified eligibility would result in significant cost savings to states.290 
Also, the concerns that state agencies would no longer act as the 
representative payees of last resort or help children apply for SSI if the 
agencies cannot take the resulting benefits would be reduced.291 State 
agencies would be incentivized to provide the services to ensure that all 
eligible children receive SSI benefits, thereby resulting in greater 
federal reimbursement of state costs through the categorical IV-E 
eligibility. The states would receive reimbursement through the IV-E 
benefits, leaving the SSI benefits available to better address the foster 
children's current needs, or as a future resource to help the children in 
their struggle for independence as they transition out of care. 
E. An Example of Legislative Progress 
Advocates in California have had recent success in promoting state 
legislation, Assembly Bill 1633 CAB 1633), designed to increase the 
number of foster children receiving Social Security benefits and to reign 
in agency practices regarding the use of those benefits.292 The 
legislation, signed by the Governor on October 7, 2005, aims to increase 
screening of foster children to determine possible eligibility for Social 
Security benefits, to provide children leaving foster care with up to 
$2000-the federal SSI resource limit-in conserved benefits to aid in 
the transition to independent living, and to better inform youth of their 
eligibility for benefits and the ways in which they can establish and 
retain eligibility after leaving foster care.293 Preferably, the specifics of 
the legislation would go even further to protect foster children's Social 
Security benefits. However, the new law is a very important step in the 
right direction. 
AB 1633 establishes a "Foster Care Social Security and 
Supplemental Security Income Assistance Program" and includes 
289 See supra notes 151-152 and accompanying text. 
290 The Pew Commission on Children in Foster Care provide other important 
recommendations, including "de-linking" IV-E eligibility so that federal foster care assistance is 
provided to assist states in caring for all children in foster care. PEW COMMISSION ON CHILDREN 
IN FOSTER CARE, FOSTERING THE FUTURE: SAFETY, PERMANENCE AND WELL-BEING FOR 
CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE 23-24 (2004), available at http://pewfostercare.org/research/ 
docs/FinaiReport. pdf. 
291 See supra notes 103-104, 120-121 and accompanying text. 
292 See Press Release, National Center for Youth Law, Governor Signs National Center for 
Youth Law Bill to Help Foster Youth Leaving Care (Oct. 7, 2005), available at 
http://www.youth1aw.orgldownloads/ABI633_PressRe1ease.doc. 
293 Cal. State Assembly Bill 1633 (Oct. 7, 2005), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/ 
pub/bilUasm/ab _160 1-1650/ab _1633_ bill_ 20051007_ chaptered.pdf. 
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clarifications of agency responsibility.294 For example, the legislation 
requires county child welfare offices to apply to be appointed as 
representative payee for foster children "when no other appropriate 
party is available to serve."295 While essentially tracking existing 
federal regulations explaining that state agencies should be the last 
option for representative payees, restating this hierarchy in state statute 
may help to eliminate the practice of selecting the state agency as 
representative payee through a virtually automatic process.296 The state 
agency is also required to establish interest-bearing maintenance 
accounts for each child's benefits and to establish procedures for 
disbursing money from the accounts. The agency is further directed 
that it may use benefits from the accounts "only for the following 
purposes: (1) For the use and benefit of the child. (2) For purposes 
determined by the county to be in the child's best interest."297 While it 
is not clear whether the language will provide any limit on the ability of 
the agency to use the benefits to reimburse state costs, these 
requirements may provide additional authority for the principle that the 
agency must apply individualized discretion in deciding upon the best 
use of benefits for each child. Moreover, the legislation includes an 
important clarification that the agency must adhere to federal law by 
placing certain back-awards of Social Security benefits into dedicated 
accounts, the funds in which can be used only for special needs and 
cannot be used for current maintenance costs (and therefore cannot be 
used to reimburse state foster care costS).298 This clarification is 
especially important in California, as the state agency had a past 
practice of by-passing the dedicated account rules. 299 
Further, AB 1633 requires the state agency to convene a 
workgroup of agency staff, advocates, stakeholders, and current and 
former foster youth.300 The workgroup is charged with developing best 
practice guidelines for county agency offices regarding foster children's 
Social Security benefits.30) The future guidelines must establish 
procedures for screening foster children for potential eligibility for 
Social Security benefits, and for assisting in the application and appeals 
process.302 This required subject of the future guidelines is important to 
294 Id. at § 4. 
295 Id. 
296 See supra notes 200-207 and accompanying text. There is possible limitation with the use 
of "party" in the requirement, and any further clarification through regulation or the "best practice 
guidelines" should ensure that the possible persons and organizations that can be considered as 
representative payees should not be limited to parties in the juvenile court proceedings. 
297 Cal. State Assembly Bill 1633, § 4. 
298 Id. 
299 See supra notes 263-271 and accompanying text. 
300 Cal. State Assembly Bill 1633, § 4. 
301 Id. 
302 Id. 
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address the policy goal of ensuring that all eligible foster children 
receive Social Security benefits.303 The workgroup is also charged with 
making recommendations "regarding the feasibility and cost-
effectiveness of reserving an amount, not to exceed the federal SSI 
resource limit, of foster children's social security ... benefits in lieu of 
reimbursing the county and the state for care and maintenance. "304 The 
critically important stated purpose of these recommendations is to 
"assist[] the child in his or her transition to self-sufficient living upon 
leaving foster care .... "305 Ideally, the recommendations should not be 
limited to suggesting a reserve amount less than the "federal SSI 
resource limit" of $2000, as there are multiple ways in which the 
benefits can used as part of a plan for the transition to independence in 
which the resource limit would not apply.306 Also, the workgroup is to 
address the "feasibility and cost-effectiveness" of establishing reserve 
amounts so there does not appear to be a mandate for the state to follow 
the future recommendations.307 Mandatory implementation would 
clearly be preferred. 
While the legislation could provide stronger protections for foster 
children's Social Security benefits, the required workgroup 
recommendations, along with the other provisions in AB 1633, provide 
a framework for significant improvement over past agency practices. 
The new law provides for the deliberative policy discussions that foster 
children have needed, and that will hopefully serve as a model for 
similar discussions in other states. 
CONCLUSION 
The foster care system is "unquestionably broken."308 The 
representative payee system is "fundamentally flawed."309 At the 
convergence of these two failing systems are children with unmet needs 
303 See supra notes 120-121 and accompanying text. 
304 Cal. State Assembly Bill 1633, § 4. 
305 Id. 
306 See supra notes 140-144 and accompanying text. It is certainly possible for the workgroup 
recommendations to recognize such exceptions to the resource limit and include strategies to 
utilize those available options without contradicting the statutory language. 
307 Cal. State Assembly Bill 1633 at § 4. However, with the workgroup including 
participation of directors of county child welfare offices, arguments for acceptance of the future 
recommendations should certainly be bolstered, even without mandatory implementation. 
308 Press Release, Pew Comm'n on Children in Foster Care, Pew Commission on Children in 
Foster Care Releases Sweeping Recommendations to Overhaul Nation's Foster Care System 
(May 18, 2004), http://pewfostercare.orgJdocs/index.php?DoclD=47; see also Guggenheim, 
supra note 4; Ramsey, supra note 49; Gordon, supra note 97. 
309 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, MONITORING REPRESENTATIVE 
PAYEE PERFORMANCE: MANAGEMENT AND STAFF SURVEY, A-09-96-64212, at 4 (Feb. 1997), 
http://www.ssa.gov/oigJADOBEPDF/A-09-96-642l2.pdf. 
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who are being used as a source of state revenue. The children's current 
needs are not met while in foster care, and they are not provided with 
services and resources necessary for a successful transition out of foster 
care. Rather than using the children's Social Security benefits as an 
opportunity to provide additional services to meet the children's current 
needs, or as an opportunity to conserve the funds as part of a plan for 
the children's transition to independence, the benefits are funneled into 
the coffers of the state bureaucracies. This practice is not the result of 
clear federal guidance or thorough policy discussions-with the 
exception recently initiated in California-but is simply the ad-hoc 
reaction of state agencies to an available source of funds. Foster 
children deserve better. 
